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CONTRACT comes to a lawyer as a term laden with connotations
of doctrine and theory. Unilaterals and bilaterals, detriment,
pre-existing duty, accord executory or accord and satisfaction,
peculiar rules on notes and bills and warranties in insurance and
substantial performance in construction deals, objective stand-
ard and the meeting of the minds, simple rules or rules laden
with exceptions, writings and seals and the statute of frauds and
the rule of integration, specific performance, unjust enrichment,
declaration of trust and conditional device, undisclosed princi-
pals, corporation charters, successive assignees, situs of debts,
attachment, inheritance and taxation-as one ranges through
the various technical phases two things happen. First, to get
any coherence in the grasp of detail one is tempted to mark off
a field called, perhaps, "general contract theory." And if one
does this, he finds problems of gratuitous promises, of successive
assignees, of beneficiaries, hiding silently out of sight in a
"law" of trusts; problems of taxation, "liberty of contract," in-
heritance, garnishment, dropping off into "constitutional law ;"
problems of anticipatory control of transactions dividing them-
selves queerly between this "general law of contract," the field
of evidence, and general odds and ends, such as limitations when
the problem is whether the statute is or is not to be contracted
against; and those remedies which give any "law" of contract
ninety-five percent of its meaning wandering afield into dam-
ages, quasi-contracts, equity and pleading. All of this, wholly
without reference to the happy way in which those cases which
do not happen to fit whatever type of "general theory" manages
to get set up (cases on the formation of the depositor's agree-
*Professor of Law, Columbia University; author of A Realistic Juris-
prudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 CoL. L. Ruv. 431, and BRAML3 BusI
(1930)..
This paper was first prepared, in much more compact form and without
the notes, for use in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. The editors wise-
ly felt it desirable for the article "Contract" to contain more Roman and
comparative law material, and more material on the history of doctrine,
than I had included. Collaboration with Dean Pound then became advisa-
ble, in order to insure to the Encyclopedia the benefit of a wide background
in those fields. But our own society offers its peculiar unity and charac-
ter, and it seemed worth while to expand and explore the bearings of my
initial paper in the hope of gaining in sharpness of focus what is thereby
sacrificed in comprehensiveness. It is a peculiar pleasure to be able to
offer the result, as a study of the common law, in a number dedicated to the
author of The Common Law, to the thinker whose work is the major foun-
dation on which the realistic trends in jurisprudence rest.
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ment with his banker, for instance, or often on insurance, or
on gratuitous undertakings cognizable in tort or recognized as
agencies) drop quietly out of contemplation, unnoticed, unmissed,
unmourned-and u naccounted for.
And second, even if the lawyer surmounts such obstacles as
these to a true, full synthesis, he finds his mind riveted on law
and legal obligation; he takes the court's decision for the fact of
life; he assumes that what the court decides must in some ob-
scure fashion represent what people do. Preoccupation with the
niceties of doctrine almost compels such straight-jacketing of
interest. Hence, if "a contract" is illegal and unenforceable,
that is enough to know. If the first assignee prevails, why that
is that. And the battle between objective, subjective, and ob-
jective-subjective theory I rages, but rages only over those
border-line cases which semi-occasionally trouble courts of law,
and almost never trouble people.
There is no fault to be found with systematizing so much as
we can of the rules on promises, or on assumpsit and its descend-
ants, or on obligations arising out of transaction. Such sys-
tematization offers much chance of gain. Indeed, if we can keep
a systematization from setting itself up as exclusively valid as
soon as it is made, and if we can keep ourselves awake to the
situations concerned, awake to people and their doings as well
as to the particular legal compartments we have found it inter-
esting (or merely possible) to systematize, we even stand a
chance of avoiding that loss-via rigidification of rule and of
imagination-which is part of the price men commonly pay for
a new systematization. Neither is there fault to be found with
a thorough canvassing of legal technicality over a less ambitious
field, in its harder, more brittle, less seductively systematized
details; nor yet with those who prefer to stop when they have
pursued such a canvass unto the uttermost case in the reports.
Yet I think that there is another area to be explored, and a
grateful one; one from whose exploration-though it be but a
first dash into the snow-fields-one returns with fresh eyes and
fresh zest to the study of the heaped up cases and of the frail-
seeming but sometimes steel-strong girders of doctrine. That
area is the role of contract in the social order, the part that con-
tract plays in the life of men. What price this curious legal in-
stitution-if legal institution it be? If not, what price this social
institution, and what relation have its legal phases to its others,
and to its meaning to society?
We have records, here and there, of explorations. Maine's
I Oliphant's position I understand to be that the objective exTressions of a
promisor set the first measure of his obligation, limited further, however, by
the subjective understanding of the promisee.
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famous dictum of "status to contract ;1' 2 Isaacs' hypothesis that
status-to-contract-to-status runs in cycles or in pendular swing-
ing; 3 Demogue's presentation in terms of major contracts with
tails, appendages, adhesions, of various details; 4 Pound's devel-
opment of "relation" as a status-like element constantly latent
and now re-emergent in our order; 5 Ehrlich's inquiry into
agreement as a constitution-making device of sub-groups within
the state, and into the relation of legal to non-legal ways and
norms; 6 Ely's attempt to place contract in relation to prop-
erty; 7 Commons' more successful study of rent-bargain, price-
bargain, and wage-bargain, as foci and levers for the adjustment
of an economic system to new strains, and as important control-
ling factors in new development outside the law; the econo-
2 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Pollock's ed. 1930) 182. Maine, it will be re-
membered, very carefully uses "status" in this generalization "to signify
these personal relations only" (those "derived from and to some extent
still colored by the powers and privileges anciently residing in the fam-
ily") and avoids "applying the term to such conditions as are the imme-
diate or remote result of agreement." My usage here differs.
Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 34.
'DEMOGUE, MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1921) 472, 477. My
phrasing is hardly fair to Demogue; it hits but one of his two phases of "ad-
hesion," the other being the presentation to individuals of complete forms
(railroad ticket, etc.) not subject to dicker, to take or leave.
5 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (1917) 30
HAuv. L. REv. 201; SPIrr OF THE COMMON LAW (1912) c. L Isaacs' criti-
cism op. cit. supra note 3 of Pound's position that "status to contract" has
"no foundation in our legal history" is obviously sound. Yet the curious
assertion is repeated, without notice of the criticism, four years later,
Ibid. 28.
"Norm" is used in this paper to mean a rule or standard of Oughtness,
not a statistical norm. "Normal" is used loosely.
6 EHRLICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1913), esp. c.
II-V, XVII. This whole paper builds at every point on Ehrlich, as any
such paper must. And on Veblen. And, as always, on Max Weber.
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (2d. ed. 1925).
7 ELY, CONTRACT AND PROPERTY (1914).
8 COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) c. VI-V-II--a
book whose insight is too little noted because it is too legal for the layman,
too lay to satisfy a meticulous legal critique. I have derived further sug-
gestion from many quarters: Messrs. Alvin Johnson and William Seagle of
the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences; and my colleague Patterson, in com-
ments on this paper; Morris Cohen, especially Property and Sovcreignty
(1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 8.; Hale, especially Coercion and Diatribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State (1923) 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470; Underhill
Moore; Samuel Klaus; Wigmore, especially The Pledge Idea (1897) 10
HAnV. L. REV. 321, 389; 11 ibid. 18; and 5 EvmENCS (2d ed. 1923); AMES,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) C. XII-XIV; POUND, INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1924) c. VI, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALU
L. J. 454; Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration (1919) 28 ibid. 621; Wright,
Opposition of Law to Business Usages (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 917. M'y own
papers, The Effect of Legal Institutions on Economics (1925) 15 AM. EC.
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mists at large, in their study of the effects of free contract and
of specialization on the development of capitalism, on mobiliza-
tion of capital, on the allocation of risks, and, finally, on the di-
vorce of investment from control." So much, indeed, has been
done that some hope offers of putting together a sketch of the
whole. Chimerical such a sketch must be-compounded of parts
strangers to each other, a dream-thing, and mayhap a monster;
worse than chimerical in the gaping incompleteness of content
and of form. Yet worth attempting. Rules, technicalities, sys-
tematizations gain meaning, gain opalescence, gain vibrancy,
when their fragile beauty is seen-though imperfectly-against
the rich background of the Great Society.
I. ORIGINS
"Contract" itself is an ambiguous concept, ambiguous particu-
larly when more is concerned than unmxed legal doctrine. (1)
The word is used especially to indicate business agreements-in-
REv. 665 and (1928) PRoC. CONF. SOCIUL WORK 127 also bear on the prob-
lems raised.
9 Any study in descriptive economics sheds light on the work of the con-
tract institution. One has only to run through some of the major heads
in the credit field to appreciate the range of suggestion involved: public
credit, and e.g., the use of Liberty Bonds to remobilize industry and trade
and as a means of hardly noticed but terrific taxation by inflation; bank
credit, and the use of deposits, contract-created-currency, in place of
money; commercial credit, with the interlocking problem of movement of
goods; consumption credit, and the double questions, one, of handling the
non-bankable loans of the non-merchant, and two, of the relation of in-
stallment buying to the social and economic structure; investment credit,
with its ramifications: intangible and inflatable evidences of wealth, con-
centration of control with diffusion and dilution of investment, the shifting
relation of banker and industrialist, the pressure of fixed charges upon
production and marketing policy, the problems of central exchanges, and
the rest. And the contrast of the modern picture with that sketched in
such works as Tawney's introduction to the Discourse on Usury (1925) and
especially Ehrenberg's Zeitalter der Fugger brings out with some vigor
the extent to which refinement and adjustment of the legal machinery
eases, speeds, complicates and magnifies the processes. Not that the dif-
ference is attributable to legal machinery alone. Legal machinery for is-
sues of negotiable bonds, callable serially, with Jacob Fugger as under-
writer instead of lender, would not alone have solved the Hapsburg finan-
cial problem; nor even the assembling of funds. But without such ma-
chinery and the tapping of innumerable private purses which with its help
become available, even the Fuggers could not meet the imperial needs.
The other side of the picture appears when one considers the American in-
vestment market before the war and the ensuing effects of the nationwise,
high powered education which The war brought in the mechanics, meaning,
and habits of bond-buying. Legal institution and the complexes of social
institutions essential to its effectiveness must concur, to get results. Veblen,
I think it was, who drove home that "capital" as merely capital goods is
meaningless without the accompanying technology; whereas the technology
is crippled, lacking the capital goods.
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fact, as such, irrespective of their legal consequences-irrespec-
tive indeed of whether they have legal consequencs. At times,
on the fringes of discussion, this use may overlap into the non-
business field. (2) Or the word is used to indicate agreements-
in-fact with legal consequences. Not merely pact vestita as
distinct from nudL pacta, but barter and outright conveyance,
and even-again on the fringes-any form of gift in which as-
sent of the donee may be a matter of concern. This, roughly,
was Ely's use. (3) Again, the word indicates the legal effects,
if such there be, of promises-including those various incidents
which, if I may twist Demogue's phrase, "adhere" to major
promises of various kinds. This last, stricter concept Corbin
.has demonstrated to be singularly useful for the law; it will here
be adopted. I shall endeavor to reserve "promise" for the prom-
ise-in-fact, "contract" for the legal effects of such a promise.
(4) A fourth current meaning of the word, the writing embody-
ing an agreement (commonly assumed to be one with legal con-
sequences) may here be disregarded.
Whichever use of the term may be favored, what is clear is
that for the present purpose discrimination among various con-
cepts is needed. No discussion of the meaning of "contract"
in society can be confined to a single one of the concepts sug-
gested. Such a discussion must indicate and must have verbal
means to indicate which of them, at any given point, is in ques-
tion. But it must range over them all. Interaction between
them is unceasing. The law of contract takes its beginning, for
instance, in the notion that legal officials 10 should enforce, or
should at least draw into reckoning, certain of men's bargains
or promises. (Quite primitively, one would have to class with
bargain or promise that more primitive form of exchange-device,
the non-refusable 11 gift, whether expected by virtue of the occa-
sion or not, which imposes a felt obligation to reciprocate.) Law
draws life, throughout, from the attitude of laymen toward
changing types of bargain---or of simple promise. On the other
hand, to some extent the shaping of agreements-in-fact turns on
the type and extent of enforceability currently available at law.
Normality and Abnormality of Contract
The beginning is in a society in which bargains and promises
10 Or men when doing official acts. Specialized order-officials there need
not be, but specialized 'conduct-with-reference-to-order-and-disputes there
must be, before "law" can be differentiated from the general matrix of
ways.
11 Social duty to accept rather than social disability to refuse; yet the
two will be hard to distinguish where evidence is scant or practice thor-
oughly ingrained; and one would not be surprised even to find a clear case
of the latter.
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are as rare as are some hundred other matters of our present
daily life, from telephones, large cities, travel and quick trans-
portation, to investment, credit, money and specalization for in-
direct exchange. In such conditions reliance on promises or
even on bargains is in natural consequence unusual, unreason-
able, an individual risk of the relier. By way of illustration
rather than of proof consider those early trader-pirates who
traded, robbed or fled with equal readiness according to the ap-
parent balance of power of the instant. Or consider the scorn
which Odysseus would share with Kim for one who gave truth
to a stranger without compelling reason. Reliance on promises,
like reliance on anything else, is in good part a function of usage
and familiarity. Even more so is that perceived reasonableness
of reliance which sets the first basis for official intervention.' -
Under such conditions the legal approach must be an exagger-
ated form of our early caveat emptor: 13 no enforcement until
specific particular reason is shown. And it may have been the
obviousness of such particular reason when disputes endanger-
ing the peace were compromised which led to the early impor-
tance in law of that type of agreement and which would equally
induce enforcement of that type even where reliance might fac-
tually be unreasonable, one of the parties being a notorious liar.
The other end of the development lies in a credit economy
in which bargains and promises are so much the normal course
of dealing that reliance on them is a matter of tacit presupposi-
tion; 3' to which is to be added: in a society in which interven-
1-2I do not mean that any theory of reasonable reliance called forth offi-
cial action. "It seems to me well to remember that men begin with no
theory at all, and with no such generalization as contract. They begin
-with particular cases." HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 218.
So Maine's view of Themis before rule. Op. cit. supra note 2, at 3ff. But
behind the case or its solution lie practices, and expectations, and concepts
as to what is properly to be expected and what of the expected is properly
to be insisted upon. Compare 1 VINOGRADOFF, HISTORICAL JUUrSPRUDEINCE
(1920) c. X. This is the perceived reasonableness of reliance referred to.
And it calls for much more than the mere fact of consent or agreement.
"The liabilities incurred by way of contract are more or less expressly fixed
by the agreement of the parties concerned, but those arising from a tort
are independent of any previous consent of the wrong-doer to bear the loss
occasioned by his act." HOLMEs, THE CoMMO, LAW (1881) 77. This may
be a road into modern law, and even into understanding many eras of con-
tract growth; it is no approach to origins, and none too good a one to
formal contract.
:'3 The classic expression is from Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4 (1603):
"For every one, in selling his wares, will affirm that his wares are good."
cf. Hamilton's striking article Caveat Emptor (1930) 3 E.c. Soc. ScL 280.
14 Contrast with the preceding note Holmes' neat phrasing of the present
day attitude: "When an act has been done, to the knowledge of another
party, which purports expressly to invite certain conduct on his part, and
that conduct on his part follows, it is only under exceptional and peculiar
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tion of legal officials when called upon is rather expected than
otherwise.'5 The legal approach then is, fundamentally: a bar-
gain or promise is enforceable unless reason'appears to the con-
trary. Our legal attitude toward misrepresentation and inca-
pacity is a vastly truer reflection of our basic approach on the
first point than are, for instance, the rules placing burden of
pleading and proving consideration on the plaintiff." And on
the second point, it is a fair observation that the untutored lay-'
man feels it a reproach to law that he is required even to con-
sult a lawyer in order to discover if what he thinks his rights
can be enforced in court. And at least in the field of contract
the lawyers themselves have seemed for the past half-century
well saturated with the idea that the office of the law is to en-
force the agreements laymen make-when, as, and if the laymen
make them. And this despite the qualifications which must be
made where lawyer-like deference to tradition recognizes prob-
lems in pre-existing duty and the like, or where lawyer-like as-
tuteness creates "constructive" conditions to cope with emer-
gencies the parties did not and often could not have foreseen.
It is hard in such a world to recapture the feel of early legal
thinking toward the anomaly that agreements, or promises,
should exist at all, or exist 'in such fashion as to call for official
attention. Yet the attempt goes far toward appreciation of
what difference contract makes today.
Primitive Form and Its Value
When observation first becomes possible we find the officials of
primitive law limiting their aid in enforcement to single stereo-
typed classes of transaction recognizable by specific strictly
formal or formulaic character. The type is indeed the form.
The one form may be used for accomplishing results (e.g., prom-
ise, conveyance, will) which modern eyes would view as wholly
diverse transaction types. In this there is nothing strange.
Men serve their needs with the institutional tools at hand.
Where else are they to go? And any modern draftsman, using
circumstances that it will be inquired how far the act in truth was the
motive for the conduct, whether in the case of consideration . . . or of
fraud." Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397 (1901). The quota-
tion goes to causation, not to operation in law; yet the latter is presupposed
as clearly as is the normality of relying.
5 Exaggerated but significant is the attitude of the court in Smith v.
Macdonald, 37 Cal. App. 503, 174 Pac. 80 (1918), in which a stipulation
that a promise should be void if legal steps are taken to enforce it is
worked out as a valid and enforceable covenant not to sue-part of "the
consideration" for the promise in suit-and so a defense.
16 Contrast those statutes making the signing of a promise adequate evi-
dence of consideration. Compare the very prevalent criticism of the re-
quirements of consideration in business promises.
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the form book, or manipulating the doctrine or theory of a case
to some new end, makes but a new move in the ancient game.
Fascinating is the historical problem, in any given context, of
which transaction was the first to shape the form, and of the
sequence of borrowing or specialization. 17 But that inquiry is
not essential to the purpose here.
What is essential is to note that official aid on the contract
side consists most commonly not in what we know as enforce-
ment but rather in an official declaration-or merely official rec-
ognition, when the whole burden of proceeding is on the creditor
and observance of a prescribed form of proceeding still does
duty for the later judgment of right-that an obligation is owed
and forfeit, and that the creditor is acting properly (one can
almost say "officially") when he seizes the debtor or the debtor's
assets. It may never be possible to establish whether in such
cases the official, or a type of practice recognized peculiarly as
having official character, sets the form, and law (i.e. official
practice) controls lay practice, or whether lay practice sets the
form for law to sanction. As so often, all probability speAs
here for interaction, with lay (or undifferentiated) practice
initially in the foreground, later (as official practice comes into
recognition as such) moving into the background-though al-
ways present as a pressure toward official gr'owth. The problem
seems in any event to have been the determination of when that
startling event, the forcible holding of a man (group) to a prom-
ise, was to occur; and it is vital to remember that law in its be-
ginning is almost undifferentiated from other forms of social
pressure. Formal acts of the known type 1 then signify openly
definitive intent to change the existing situation-and to be re-
lied on. Early or late, and in whatever culture, and whatever
the form in vogue, this feature is common to all. The copper
and scales, the ceremonial handclasp ("Shake on it!"), a magical
ceremony like the establishment of blood-brotherhood, the sol-
emn invocation of supernatural sanction by oath 19 or conditional
curse, the promise or act before official witnesses, the delivery
and acceptance of the unambiguous token (engagement ring,
17 Cf. IAINE, op. cit. supra note 2, at c. L, and Pollock's note R;
HOLmES, THE COlMxON LAW, c. VII. And Ehrlich speculates in the grand
manner on such matters. Op. cit. supra note 8, at 80. A beautiful in-
stance of the use of one form in accomplishing diverse results is dealt with
by A. A. Schiller in his forthcoming article, Coptic Law.
38 Dreaming is futile on such points; yet the imagination presses toward
picturing the first man to lend unmistakable assurance to his words by
drawing on some form-or by creating it-before any form was known.
One suspects cumulative accident, rather than invention.
'9 Still in use, as Holmes reminds us, on the assumption of public office, or




pledge button, King's shilling and the nosegay in the hat) or the
ambiguous token (earnest money), sealing and delivery, inden-
ture or broken shard or crooked sixpence, the speaking of the
binding words, the known words which had power ("I war-
rant;" "Spondesne? Spondeo;" "Open, Sesame !") -whether
sanctions other than legal be invoked in addition or not, and
whether or not the form accomplishes additional purposes (iden-
tification of person, transaction, and terms), the common pur-
pose of the form is clear. The overt sign of utter intent to as-
sume obligation has been given. The other party has reason to
rely.20 The consequence to be expected is both recognition by
law officials, and-at least as soon as this has occurred-a strong
tendency thereafter to limit the number of these recognized
forms which will move either officials to act or laymen to feel
justified in taking words as meaning obligation.
Legal v. Non-legal Obligation
Yet as an economy changes, as it grows more complex, as bar-
gains become more frequent, as new types of bargain appear, the
ritual forms theretofore established on older models must prove
inadequate to cover all engagements-in-fact, inadequate to pro-
tect all reliance-in-fact. Engagement-in-fact and that social
sense of duty to perform which we may roughly call non-legal
obligation do not for that reason cease. On the contrary, they
grow more distinct as an existent and important phase of life.
But legal obligation comes, in the measure of the new develop-
ments outside the ancient forms, to diverge from non-legal. Such
divergence is in one aspect familiar enough. There is the social
or "moral" obligation recognized at law not at all, or only in-
directly: obligation to pay a gambling debt treated as a debt
peculiarly of honor precisely because no action at law will lie;
obligation to live up to a gratuitous business promise; obliga-
tion to provide for a child or dependent which finds recognition
at law only as supposed rules of law are twisted out of shape
in the efforts of courts, despite the rules, to enforce any explicit
promise in which the non-legal obligation is given form enough
to be laid hold of.21 The other aspect of the divergence, the
difference in content between the running, flexible obligation
20 "To explain flow mankind first learned to promise, we must go to meta-
physics, and find out how it ever came to frame a future tense." Ibid. 251.
Right in essence. But it is interesting that both ancient Hebrew and mod-
ern German manage promises with a present tense. Insight does not al-
ways need exact verbal symbols, although symbols both further and limit
insight. One might risk the suggestion: as law to life, so language to
thought.
21 Cf. Note, Family Agreements as Exceptions to Orthodox Third-
Party Beneficiary Rules (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 117.
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understood in fact by the parties and the rigid, stereotyped obli-
gation which is all the law will recognize, has had vastly less
attention. "Incidents of adhesion" take on an aspect sometimes
sinister when they are affixed, in the teeth of intent, merely be-
cause the court arrives at the conclusion that "a sale," "an
agency," "a partnership," or whatnot is the transaction-type
the parties have seized upon.2 2 Again, that the rule of integra-
tion and the statute of frauds pay a price for what they achieve
is evidenced sufficiently by the struggles of the courts to find
exceptions for deserving cases. Such modern analogues or illu-
strations as these are adduced, despite the appearance of ana-
chronism, in -first instance because what is true under a law
as flexible as our own is true a, fortiori in an era of greater a
priori rigidity;23 but in the second instance because the process of
legal rigidification and divergence of legal from non-legal obliga-
tion is perennial. Too much insistence on the illustrations of
bygone centuries risks an unduly comforting suggestion that in
this enlightened day we must have worked free of trouble.
But we have not thus worked free of trouble, and if the
processes of society do not undergo some unforeseeable revolu-
tion there is no likelihood that we ever shall. Law must grow
fixed, in most of its parts, and relative to most of the ways of
society apart from law.2  And the ancient problem must con-
tinue to recur. The feature of its recurrence which I wish to
pound on here is that to the extent of such divergence between
non-legal obligation and the legal obligation officially recognized
on the same facts, the legal obligation ceases to function merely
as an extra insurance that engagements will be performed. That
role, in essence, it need not lose. But it acquires another. It
comes to function also as a source of risk. If the other party
appeals to law, then to the extent that the obligation is viewed
by layman and by law-man differently, I shall either get less,
or be held to more, than the customary understanding calls for.
And I repeat, such a divergence, such an incursion of risk, is a
constant tendency as soon as legal technique becomes specialized,
as soon as officials begin looking for their solutions not directly
221 may seem at this point to be inconsistent with what is said infra,
especially note 63. There is no inconsistency. To affix incidents in the
teeth of intent may be sinister. It may be wise. All depends on the judg-
ment and sense of fact and need displayed. As Morris Cohen remarks of
reasoning by analogy: it is always risky; you "simply" have to lay hold of
the right analogy.
231 share the opinion that what one may term an informed as contrasted
with a naive rigidity is in process of emergence in various parts of modern
law. See infra concerning standardization. Demogue, op. cit. supra note
4, at c. XIII, is very suggestive.
24For some further discussion ef. Llewellyn, Law and the Modcrn Mind:
Legal Illusion (1931) 31 COL. REV. 82, 87 if; BRAwnE Busni (1930) 61 ff.
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at the life before them, but indirectly at the deposits of their
own or their predecessors' prior dealings with similar situa-
tions.25 Surely no man can read commercial cases in our courts
today, or follow the movement toward commercial arbitration,
and blink the presence of the phenomenon. And surely it is
obvious that as the law of contract thus constantly grows rigid
upon its own premises and to itself ("certain and reckonable"
or "out of date and over-formal"-the phrasing is immaterial)
it offers the cautious and canny layman an advantage over his
unschooled adversary. Hence the no less constant counter-ten-
dency: the subjection of law to reformatory pressure from the
newer uses and understandings in the world of dealings, or from
perception of abuses arising out of the manipulation of legal
technique.
The Forfeit Root and Security
Behind and beside the law, early or developed, there works not
only the fact, thus far chiefly discussed, of credit, of trust, but
also the opposite fact of distrust, of self-help. If oath or pro-
mise is the type of the first, forfeit and hostage are the type
of the second; for all that we can see, the second roots as early
and as deep. And it continues still. So in the modern use of
conditions on promises, as when the continuance of life insur-
ance is set free of any .promise by the insured to pay and is
instead merely conditioned upon regular payment of the prem-
iums. So in the use of security devices, from the pawn to the
corporate blanket mortgage. There is indeed little question that
both law and form of early contract take origin as much or more
in the giving of a forfeit as in the making of an unambiguous
engagement (the word itself derives from the incurring of obli-
gation by giving a "gage"). Often the two merge. I dare to
doubt, however, the too-ready assumption by German legal his-
torians26 that at the outset the picture is regularly one of a
Schuld or obligation perceived as such, accompanied by a some-
what inadequately adjusted Haftung or enforcement machinery.
To me it seems that in a non-credit economy it must have been
at least equally prevalent to regard the forfeit as a mere pres-
sure: not "you must do what you have promised, on pain of
forfeit," but: "you have given up a thing which you can get
back only by doing a stated thing." At the outset such a pure
forfeit arrangement involves no necessary duty-concept.21 It
25 This will not be read as involving any criticism of the tendency and in-
-deed necessity of courts utilizing such deposits. Criticism will begin only
when one finds them ceasing to refresh old indirect experience by new more
,direct experience.
20 Which even Wigmore falls into, despite his sanely critical attitude and
rechecking of original sources.
27 It may, or it may not. It may indirectly, by way of the forfeit-
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may exist as well with as without such a companion. Yet out of
the forfeit, sooner or later, a duty idea will develop. "Duty"
grows quite as well out of anticipation of unpleasant conse-
quences of non-accomplishment as out of a sense of what action
is by custom expected (and so "right, and so due") in the cir-
cumstances. Such seems to be the line of evolution in much
religious duty-e. g., the duties of ritual propitiation.28  And
quite significantly do our courts currently speak of any burden-
some condition as a "duty."
However this may be, in system after system the primitive
forfeit has been refined slowly into a security-device, and a no-
tion that the real and primary center of attention is the obli-
gation has worked its way into law. It would be a fascinating
task to set against Wigmore's masterly presentation of the
process in olden systems,2 9 instances of the recurrence of the
struggle, along the same type-lines, in more modern times. With-
out mentioning the familiar history of our own mortgage of
real estate, it does pay to recall that first in the use of the abso-
lute deed, again in the introduction of the deed of trust, and
finally in the installment land contract the problem arose anew,
to be solved anew-and in the main to be solved slowly, and
with fresh groping, in each instanceY' Nor did the solution
for mortgages of realty carry with it an equally clear solution
in the chattel field; and whereas the trust receipt has been con-
cerned chiefly with avoidance of recording statutes and rules on
bona fide purchase, the conditional sale of chattels from say
1860 to date has wandered tortuously under the accidental suc-
cession of fact pressure 3 2 through a course which parallels amaz-
giver's feeling of responsibility for the hostages he has pledged-to them or
to their kin or to himself. Cf. HOLMES, COMMON LAW 249 if. It may
appear different to the two parties. The Samnites after the Caudine Fors
undoubtedly thought the Romans had assumed a Schdd. Livy's Regulus,
despite having used express words of obligation, views that matter differ-
ently: "Who is so ignorant of the law of treaties as not to know" that the
general can be repudiated (I take it, without ensuing obligation) if that
general be delivered over? Regulus is a hero. One wonders then if the
much decried Punica fides is to be defined as breach of faith without a tech-
nical excuse; or whether Regulus really saw no obligation-like the seller in
Chandelor v. Lopus; or whether the difference depends on a hundred years;
or on whose foot was pinched.
28 2 SUMNER AND KELLER, SCIENCE OF SOCIETY (1927) c. XXXII ff.
29 The Pledge Idea, supra note 8.
30 Compare e. g., Kidd, Trust Deeds, and Mortgages in Califona (1915)
3 CALIF. L. REV. 381.
31 On the part played in case-law growth by the succession of fact-
pressure, see LLEwELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES
(1930) c. III, esp. 219, 336 ff., 340 if. Contrast 329, n. 1. For the historical
sequence in conditional sales law, see Notes (1929) 29 COL L. REV. 900,
1123. Exceedingly interesting is the modern German half-finished repeti-
tion of the process, in the Sicherungsilbercigizzng as to chattels.
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ingly the growing medieval Germanic law of land-gage. The
conception of risk on the creditor, as being the "owner;" the
conception that failure to pay on time wholly forfeits the se-
curity, with provision neither for foreclosure sale nor for ac-
counting as to any excess in value over the debt; 31 the power of
creditor in possession to transfer free of debtor's rights; " the
conception that resorting to the security destroys any right upon
the debt 34-- all these appear. The last indeed in super-medieval
glory: in the more primitive law, so long as there was no legal
debt, i. e., no Hcftung apart from the gage, resort to the gage
as an exclusive remedy was plain enough; we moderns have
managed an exclusiveness despite a better insight.3
II. CONTRACT AS AN ADJUSTMENT DEVICE
In such a survey as this, however, interest centers less imme-
diately upon what society (including the lawyer) has done to
contract than on what contract may have done to society 0 As
to agreement-in-fact, an influence is obvious. Viewing a status-
organized society as a whole, it is trite that bargain is a tool of
change and of growing individual self-determination, as is also'
any property regime which by increasing individual control in-
creases the scope of experiment, the differentiation of holdings,
and the factual effectiveness of the bargains of the wealthy. It
is trite, moreover, on the bargain side, that the bargain-effects
just mentioned wax as bargains come to cover the fature, and as
they become in that aspect enforceable even though the other
party breaks faith. It is a little less trite that the self-determina-
tion aspect varies not only with the number of bargains which
are in fact available to a particular bargainor, but also and mot
vigorously with the degree to which he has the wherewithal to
individualize the phases of the bargain to his desires-or, as the
case may be, to sub-divide a single situation into a variety of
specialized bargains to meet his needs. The power to shift one's
status-in-block a single time (becoming a priest) or even often
(marriage and divorce, enlistment for a term) gets one a vast
first step along the road "from status to contract." But this
first stage, however vast, remains one single stage. Per contra,
32 See, as to both conceptions, BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIO AL
SALES (1924) 197, 182 ff.
33 Cf. Bank of California v. Danamiller, 125 Wash. 255, 215 Pac. 321
(1923).
34 BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 170 ff.
35 Notes (1929) 29 COL. L. Ray. 960, 1123, studies in the development of
the doctrine of election.
36 Contract is of course not outside of, but a part of, anything that can be
denominated "society." The question is: what part does it play in the




and taking not a fixed but a mobile rgime as the base-line, to the
extent that the available bargains both expand their block-scope
(employment to do an odd job v. employment as permanent pur-
veyor of an intermittent service v. closed shop factory employ-
ment v. yellow dog open shop v. company town v. indentured
plantation labor) and become standardized for whole groups and
tend to become exclusively available, a rgime of "contract"
(bargain) moves a long step toward status, toward the regi-
mentation of men into groups and classes, and toward stabiliza-
tion of social relations.37 A rough equality of bargaining power
has been rightly stressed in this connection as having importance
far beyond the "liberty of contract" of legal and constitutional
theory; but the flexibility of the bargains which are in fact avail-
able needs no less stress.
Bargain is then the social and legal machinery appropriate to
arranging affairs in any specialized economy which relies on
exchange rather than tradition (the manor) or authority (the
army, the U. S. S. R.) for apportionment of productive energy
and of product. It is a machinery which like status, but in
contrast to tort, makes it easy to insist on positive, affrmative
action. Contract in the strict sense is the specifically legal ma-
chinery appropriate when such an economy moves into the phase
of credit-meaning or connoting thereby future dealings in gen-
eral; in which aspect the mutual reliance of two dealers on their
respective promises comes of course into major importance.
This machinery of contract applies in general to the market for
land, goods, services, credit, or for any combination of these.2
Or if one prefers to minimize the danger of reifying the ab-
straction he may put it: what we mean by contract is whatever
the officials do about promises in these various fields ---and cur-
37 The question is not whether this is good or bad, but merely as to cer-
tain aspects of what happens. Standardized relationships favor security,
simplify inter-group relationships, and may well offer machinery for pro-
ducing more to distribute and for its more effective distribution. They may
be needed as an adjustment to the technical phases of mass production and
mass marketing. And indeed, to develop appreciation of the finer shades of
individual difference inside a more firmly established general pattern may
be a line toward a higher esthetic and humanistic culture than individual-
ism favors. But none of this touches the text.
38 Holmes as early as The Commwn Law, with what seems to one unfa-
miliar with the then literature extraordinary grasp and originality, both
states and develops the risk point of view as basic to contract.
39 It is interesting to watch Holmes' thought on this grow sharper as a
heterodox insight bores its way into his working kit. In 1881 he writes (my
italics) : "The statement that the effect of a promise is the assumption of a
risk of a future event does not mean that there is a second subsidiary
promise to assume that risk, but that the assumption follows as a comse-
quence directly enforced by the law, without the promisor's cooperation."
THE COMMON LAw 302. "The only universal consequence of a legally bind-
ing promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the prom-
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iously enough, there are similarities, some of them significant,
to be found in what the officials do from time to time from field
to field.
Is the Law of Contract Necessary?
All of which, however, begs the question of why there need be
any legal machinery at all for the purposes mentioned, other
than mere protection of the factual results of accomplished
bargains, work, deliveries, and payments. The peace, and more
dubiously the law of alienability and of ownership, at least
as against persons entrusted with possession-what more is
needed? As one puts such a question, one recalls first how sel-
dom law touches directly any case in which a promise has been
performed, or in which an inadequate performance has been re-
ceived in satisfaction. Promise, performance and adjustment
are in this sense primarily extra-legal. It needs no argument
that if they did not normally occur without law's intervention,
no regime of future dealings would be possible. The lawyer's
idea of "contract," applied to these normal cases, where per-
formance and informal business adjustments proceed to occur,
is thus a conceptual projection of trouble and the legal spawn
of trouble upon the untroubled in fact. Applied to such cases,
the lawyer's idea.of "contract" is unreal in genesis and mis.
leading in implication-unless, which is the matter of inquiry,
what the courts may do in the possible case of trouble is a needed
ised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from
interference until the time for fulfilment has gone by, and therefore free
to break his contract if he chooses." Ibid. 301. "If we look at the law as
it would be regarded by one who had no scruples against doing anything
which he could do without incurring legal consequences, it is obvious that
the main consequence attached by the law to a contract is a greater or less
possibility of having to pay money. The only question from the purely
legal point of view is whether the promisor will be compelled to pay."
Ibid. 317. "Contract" is envisaged here as something pre-existing. Also:
"The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so
far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form
and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired
results, depend very much upon its past." Ibid. 1-2. Now contrast this
with the firm precision in 1897: "A legal duty so called is nothing btt a
prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suf-
fer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a legal right."
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 169. "If you commit a contract, you are liable to
pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass." Ibid.
175. That this does not deny the importance of rules but merely clarifies
their relation to purposes of law, and to lay action-patterns consonant with
such purposes, I have tried to develop in (1928) PROC. CONF. SOCiAL, W0oRC
129 ff., and A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 COL, L.
REv. 431. I have found no trace of this analysis in the Holmes notes to the
12th edition of Kent (1873). But it is somewhat foreshadowed in Codes
and the Arrangement of the Law (1870) 5 Aim.. L. Rnv. 1., the paternity
of which has been acknowledged in personal communication.
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factor, or at least a factor, in promise, or in performance, or in
adjustment.
Neither will it do to treat the mere presence of legal machinery
in any particular field as of itself demonstrating a need for it
there. For such presence may merely be an instance of un-
needed or even of parasitic 4 expansion of a going institution.
Law early serves a prime function as offering means of dealing
with some types of dispute not otherwise adjusted; I should
indeed be tempted to argue that the differentiation of anything
we can perceive as law begins with this.-, And even apart from
the attribution of the results or their foundation to super-nat-
ural powers, even apart from the presence of felt Oughtness
as to the content of decision, the last resort character of emerg-
ing law would seem to me enough to call forth the recurrent
tendency we find in legal machinery to set itself up, if it be
appealed to, as the exclusive means for dealing with any dis-
pute. Law regularly purports, too, to speak for the group" as
a whole, and this of necessity bespeakls a constant pressure to
40 In law-as in other institutional complexes-old patterns have been
stretched to new uses partly because some one wanted to deal with a novel
situation and found it easier to borrow and adapt a familiar pattern than
to devise one more original. But, partly, the persons stretching may be
specialists within the complex, seeking their own interest, and conferring
no corresponding benefit to others (e.g., the work-making as the legal
"folio" shrank); and, partly, they may, though laymen as to the complex,
be non-typical in tlWeir wants and needs-although successful in forcing the
adaptation into the shelter of traditional hallowing. And finally there is
a type of expansion tendency in terms not of felt need, but of felt right-
ness: expansion toward the logical limits of rationalizations, classifications,
purposes, as they appear to the men, and especially to the technicians, of
the time. In the measure that the current premises are in truth inadequate
to reflect the factual condition of the alt and its work, this logical de-
velopment also spells what one may think of as parasitic expansion. Logi-
cal development is primarily in place as to rules of pure decision or pure
convenience, where the only thing that matters is to have a rule. It is
defensible and sometimes wise in fields where advance calculation is so im-
portant as often to outweigh sanity on particular facts. Occasionally, but
chiefly in the two fields just noted, it is useful to simplify operations. Be-
yond this, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."
And even in the instances noted, "logical" development rather regularly
involves arbitrary creation of premises to develop. Compare BNMiBLE
BusH, c. IV, V; to which need be added WILLISTON, SOME MODEMN TEND-
ENCIES IN THE LAW (1929) 152 ff., and Adler, Law and the Modern Mind:
Legal Certainty (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 91.
41 And with the issuing and enforcement of directions by someone, with
corresponding observance by others.-Neither regularities of practice in
themselves, nor undifferentiated ought-feelings, nor undifferentiated pres-
sures toward conformity or non-conformity, seem to me enough to make a
concept of "law" very useful. If there be differences of taste as to the
term, it is at least clear that I am talking about that portion of law which
involves the interaction of the acts, ways, and specialized ideas of special-
ized officials with the acts, ways and ideas of laymen.
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draw into law's orbit any other important institution; it is the
stuff of other institutions which offers the subject matter of
disputes. Finally, rarely until modern times42 has expansion
of jurisdiction or business been unprofitable to the law-men
concerned. The chief counter-tendency to this expansiveness
is found in law's own formalism (compare the impediments to
assignability of choses in action) and in the tradition-set char-
acter of the molds within which law-men must move if their
action is to have standing as official. 43 Given, then, promises
present, relied on, and broken, law will sooner or later wrestle
with their breach; but it will do so whether or not society pecu-
liarly requires the wrestling.
Yet as the specialization and credit, and particularly the in-
dustrial, aspects of an economy gain ground, it becomes hard
to escape the positive case for utility of legal enforcement of
promises. Credit or reliance on a purely customary or self-inter-
est basis presupposes for effectiveness either permanence of
dealings involving long-run mutual dependence, 44 or an ingrained
traditional morality covering the point, or dealingg within a face-
to-face community (or its equivalent, a close-knit though wan-
dering guild-like interest-group such as the early medieval mer-
chants seem to have made up) in which severe group pressure
on delinquent promisors is available. These types of sanction
fail in a society mobile as to institutions, mobile as to residence,
mobile as to occupation; they fail increasingly as the market
expands spatially and in complexity. They fail, in a word, as
- As to modern times, compare the investigation of the Women's Court
in New York City, 1930-31; and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct.
437 (1927).
43 There is no more fascinating study than the conditioning of the gpc-
cialist himself by such tradition. Compare the well known resentment at
procedural simplification; the honest belief of many judges that common
law courts "cannot" render conditional judgments, of. (1931) 31 COL. Rnv.
124; or any other of the procedural limitations which favored the growth
and isolation of equitable remedies. Or the equally honest belief that
judges "cannot" make contracts for the parties. The concurring grounds
of decision in Lawrence v. Fox make a peculiar exhibit, when set beside
the insight shown in the quotation of H. Gray, J.: "The law operating upon
the act of the parties creates the duty, establishes a privity, and implies
the promise and obligation on which the action is founded." 20 N. Y. 268.
(1859). Even here the "promise" is as fictional as the "agency" that
seemed a necessary comfort to Johnson and Denio.
The eternally baffling problem is the kind and degree of interaction be-
tween this bound half of the judge's (or other specialist's) mentality and
that portion which is either consciously or intuitively at work to manipulate
traditional molds to meet felt needs. Especially illuminating are the ex-
hibits collected by ISAY, RECHTSNORM AND ENTSCHEIDUNG (1929) 60 if,;
also FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) c. XII.
44 A pretty illustration in MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOi IN SAVAaE
Socl-ry (1926). Instructive also is WEBER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 398 if,
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to long-run, long-range, impersonal bargains, as also in cases
where death, or transfer of rights, removes from the relation
what may at the outset have been a personal aspect.
Whatever the need for legal enforcement of contract in cur-
rent dealings, then, its place in an hivestmcnt structure is ob-
vious. It is essential to any approach to a market for capital,
to any machinery for mobilizing funds or diversifying invest-
ments. Equally essential with contract itself is the transfer-
ability-which is to say, the depersonalization-of contract
rights. The older view of "privity" as essential to legal action
on a contract was connected partly with semi-magical aspects
of legal form; partly with a conception of contract as an es-
sentially peculiar, unusual thing; partly with a conception that
contractual transactions had no proper importance for non-
participants. None of these conceptions fits with an investment
market; it is significant that the first free transferability, that
of bills of exchange, developed among merchants apart fron
law proper. It is further significant that merchants found no
trouble with the concept of suit by a third party beneficiary-
which still gives trouble to some courts-and that they shaved
the freely transferable contract right down to certain standard-
ized essentials. In business essence, although not so strictly in
law, a very similar standardizing and simplifying process occurs
in the investment market today. The investor looks for six or
seven familiar standard features in a stock or bond, irrespective
of the length of mortgage indenture or articles of incorporation
-six or seven features familiar and simple enough to be sum-
med up conveniently in Poor or Moody. For business purposes,
too, a distinction in kind between bonds and stocks tends defi-
nitely to disappear. Both, in the same way, are thought of as
property-as is also any prospectively profitable contract,
whether unilateral or bilateral. Both, in much the same way
again, are conceived as in the nature of promises: anticipated
performance by "the corporation" (which is factually viewed
as centered, in the managing personnel, plus some assets, plus
the established management policies) is the essence of the pic-
ture; and legal sanction in both cases looms very large. My
eyes may be blinded, but to me men do not seem to regard as
cutting to the essence (as distinct from questions of degree of
security and priority in rank) that the legal sanction in the case
of bonds goes to payment of certain sums at certain times; while
in the case of stocks the legal obligation is built around rather
than focussed on payment, built in terms of limiting dissipation
of assets and checking manipulation rather than in terms of spe-
cified positive performance. And when, finally, even interests
in realty are thrown into the bond-stock form, the role of con-
tract and near-contract in the investment field becomes per-
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vasive. Contract, not mere agreement-in-fact. Frequently
enough no other sanction than the legal exists at all. Where
other sanctions do exist (e.g., desire for continued dealings, or
for a business reputation) they show an unfortunate tendency
to fail precisely where most needed, i. e., when stress of loss (or
gain: management manipulation of the market or merger of
the debtor) is strong. Max Weber cogently remarks that ex-
pediency-founded ethics are less reliable factors in performance
than are those founded in tradition. It results that even to some
extent in short-run face-to-face dealings, and a fortiori and im-
portantly in long-run ones, legal enforceability figures as an
element of added security in credit matters; a partial insurance
against the very case of need: when credit-judgment was mis-
guided, or in case of death or assignment, or where supervening
troubles disrupt either willingness or power to perform.
Risk,- Remedy and Security Devices
It has been mentioned that this legal insurance is commonly ac-
companied by an element of legal risk. What the law official
will enforce is what he sees as the legal obligation. An agree-
ment that to a business man calls for shipment of goods as close
as conveniently possible to those described, with (as of course)
price adjustment for defective deliveries, and return only of
unusables, and replacement of those-this agreement means to
a court that the seller is to comply with the description pre-
cisely, or have no rights at all. What a buyer will curse at not
getting, on a rising market, he can then reject with impunity
if the market falls; yet this very risk of the market is one which
the deal was intended to shift to him. So also agreements to
renew indebtedness, relied on as of course by business men, are
commonly unenforceable at law; while business understanding
very commonly admits wide cancellations of legally enforceable
contracts to buy. It is true that "business understanding" of
what an agreement means, and indeed of whether an agreement
exists, is by no means unambiguous, and not always adjustable.
It is not alone wilful default, but honest difference of opinion,
which lead to disputes, and which leave some proper room
for law officials. Both ways and norms of business practice may
be firm at the center, but they are hazy at the edge; they offer
little sureness to guide in dealing with the outside and unusual
case. 45 For all that, it demands insistence that when the law
45 (1) As the base-line to measure non-legal obligation I take the practice
of the time, place and trade, save so far as the parties are shown to have
agreed on some variant. This amounts to double-barrelled objective inter-
pretation of words and acts: an objective reading of the whole situation
to get the base-line, an objective reading of words and acts for trace of a
variant. This would correspond roughly to reading words at law first in the
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light of trade usage, second in the light of the common meaning to the
hearer and the course of dealing of the parties. Only that at law one
begins with the words, not with the practice. (2) But legal and non-legal
obligation differ strikingly on another and crucial point. The law always
reaches for and commonly approximates some single definite manner and
quantity of performance as the measure of the obligation. The measure is
to be fixed and inflexible from the time of contracting, And what one
party is entitled to demand is made to coincide precisely, if possible, to
what the other party is entitled to tender. Options, if made express. are
recognized. But they are anomalous. They are even embarrassing. To
recognize them ds implicit requires effort. Whereas non-legal obligation is
in essence flexible within wide limits, and remains flexible even after the
agreement has been made. It runs not in a line without width, but in a
belt or range of permissible performances. What is due, what can be de-
manded, what can be offered, is anything within the belt-limits. There is
in addition a range within which one party or the other or both can de-
mand an alteration of terms, which will shift the whole belt of perform-
ance; this may run to delay, to shift in quantity or quality, even to outright
cancellation. So that pending performance either party can take the in-
itiative in fixing performance more narrowly. The seller, by tendering
a delivery within the permissible limits (or by demanding a permissible
alteration). The buyer, by specifying what he needs, precisely (or by
demanding a permissible alteration). Before such narrowing, the range
of proper performance is much wider than is commonly recognized at law.
Even after such narrowing, say by the buyer, it may still be wider: for
even timely specification leaves the seller such leeway as practical reason
requires for a seller in the circumstances. That what we have been ac-
customed to think of as habit, or custom, or folk way, or practice, or in-
,stitution is not a line-concept, but a belt concept, with an important range
of variation, seems to me the most vital demonstration in the penetrating
investigations of Underhill Mloore into banking practice, the result of which
are now appearing in this JOURNAL. But his results seem to me to show
no less that there are two ranges in each case: an inside range of permis-
sible (unobjectionable, unnoticed, not-adversely-reacted-to) variation, and
an outside range of the non-permissible (objectionable, noticed, adversely-
reacted-to) variation. (3) Practice is, however, rarely marked definitely
enough to set a clear standard for judging unusual cases. And circum-
stances vary cases. It may be savings bank practice to hand out money on
call, despite the 60 day clause. Is the clause therefore to be regarded as
unavailable in case of run or money stringency? A given trade may
recognize unlimited cancellation as of right, in the ordinary course. But
in the ordinary course cancellations of different buyers do not pile up. Is
the freedom to cancel to be regarded as holding equally in a cataclysmic
market? One main business of law is to set, to create, norms for such
cases of conflicting or uncertain expectation; equally so, whether it be the
law of the state or the by-law of the group. But such norms can be
created wisely only in the light of the standing practices to which the new
norm will be added, or on which it places a limiting definition. Hence one
huge value of the informed court-of-the-trade which knows and feels this
background, i. e., of the specialized as contrasted with the unsp2cialized
arbitration tribunal. See 15 AMi Ec. REv. 674 ff. And if the state's court
is called on for the purpose, it must either act in the light of those prac-
tices, and feel its way into their purposes and presuppositions, or else
be arbitrary in its results . Application of fixed rules of contract-at-large
has sense only when the case is so far removed from the run of affairs that
the decision cannot be regarded as having prospect of shaping future deals;
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official does take hold he is likely to begin with a wholly non-
customary reading of the obligation and work from that bias.
And if the commercial and legal understandings of whether
and what performance is due should fully coincide, the legal
security of the obligee would still show holes. A contracf is no
equivalent of performance; rights are a poor substitute for
goods. Holmes long ago noted that in the pinch the measure
of what a contract means is its meaning to the evil-minded per-
son. We know (but we so often gloss over) that the contract
as such gives rights only against the promisor in general, and
rights enforceable only out of his general assets; in the event
of the obligor's bankruptcy, the.right is reduced to ratable shar-
ing with other general creditors. There are devices, illegitimate
but effective, for concealing assets. There are startling statistics
on extent and amount of dividends in failure.4 The remedy at
law, then, good in the one case of need-wilful breach-becomes
dubious in the other case of need-economic distress or dishonest
bankruptcy. The results leave it dark as to how far legal en-
forceability is in truth a factor in the initial making of future
commitments and in the giving of short-term credit. They leave
it even darker as to how far such influence as is exerted on either
is to be regarded as healthy. On the simpler question, the
whether or no of influence, severe caution is indicated. That
commercial law may only touch the surface of a sufficiently
prosperous economy is suggested, e.g., by the development and
the substantial persistence until 1910 in New York of as malad-
justed a complex of rules on sales of goods as we have had.
In a few cases, such as the letter of credit litigation in the decade
following 1920, the inference is indeed unmistakable that the
law has strengthened the business credit instrument and given
it further soundness. Yet the example is inconclusive; it is
picked from a field of peculiarly long-range and indirect con-
and then only when speed of judicial administration outweighs the chance
of injustice to the litigants. And to conceive the application of such fixed
rules to make for "certainty" is to confuse certainty to the lawyer in
litigation with approximate certainty in life to the people for whom law
exists. See Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: Legal Illuson (1931)
31 COL. L. R-v. 82, 87. (E. W. Patterson contributed much to the clarifica-
tion of these suggestions.) As so often, Holmes marked the trail: "Business
men who deal with elevators can hardly be supposed to have in view the
legal machinery by which the result is worked out; but if as we suppose
they have in view that result, it is the business of the law to carry out
their intentions, if it can." Grain Elevatores (1872) 6 Aia L. Rvsv. 450, 471.
46 The N. Y. Times of Jan. 19, 1931, carries calculations by the National
Association of Credit Men based on the Attorney General's report, to
the effect that although in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, recoveries
in bankruptcy averaged 8.63 cents per dollar as against 7.61 the year be-
fore, net losses went up 49 millions because the total debts in bankruptcy
had risen from 817 to 866 millions.
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tract, and from one where peculiar financial security is expressly
bargained for. Nonetheless so much is sure: legal enforceability
is sometimes a factor in inducing performance by a debtor; a
salvage factor it always is-on bad risks, however, whose bad-
ness it may itself have contributed to begetting. Remove the
legal sanction and men will give credit with more care.47
It is at this point that the law of contract again makes con-
tact with the -law of security. From an economic angle, bar-
gaining for "security" is an intensified case of the security pro-
vided by legal enforceability alone. For it looks to cover in
part the exact risks mere contract rights leave open. The se-
cured creditor obtains beyond his general claim a right to satis-
faction out of specified assets of the debtor; he obtains moreover
a right which can be partially protected against fraud. 5 The
47Speculation is unfortunately much easier than finding out, as well as
less useful. The question runs in terms of relative quantities. Is there
enough stiffening of performance-drive by the totality of legal pressures,
after contract obligations have been assumed, to offset the effects (occur-
ring before contract obligations have been assumed) which reliance on an-
ticipated legal pressures may have in lessening credit-caution and credit-
judgment? Both phases of possible legal effect are intangible, on present
knowledge. The first is a step closer to tangibility than the second. My
own guess is that in the main writers, both legal and other, tend to over-
estimate heavily the effects of law in either aspect; but that on the other
hand any layman who ever gets to considering the effects of law in his own
case is likely then to let the idea of it influence him for more than it really
is worth. Mly guess is, too, that no general statement about "contract" or
"credit" will in this matter be worth anything; even uninformed common
sense shows huge differences to be probable between investment and com-
mercial credit; similar differences within each field, etc., are certainly to
be expected as well. And my guess is, further, that the real major effect
of law will be found not so much in the cases in which law officials actually
intervene, nor yet in those in which such intervention is consciously con-
templated as a possibility, but rather in contributing to, strengthening,
stiffening attitudes toward performance as what is to be expected and what
"is done.' If the contract-dodger cannwt be bothered, if all he needs is a
rhinoceros hide to thumb his nose at his creditor with impunity, more and
more men will become contract-dodgers. Only saps will work, in an econ-
omy of indirect, non-face-to-face contacts. And as between individual
enterprises, the competition of the contract-dodger will drive the contract-
keeper into lowering his own standards of performance, on pain of de-
struction. This work of the law-machine at the margin, in helping keep
the level of social practice and expectation up to where it is, as against
slow canker, is probably the most vital single aspect of contract law. For
in this aspect each hospital case is a case with significance for the hundreds
or thousands of normal cases. Of course "contract-law" in this aspect
includes importantly such phases of the criminal law as touch fraud, etc.;
relative importance I cannot even guess at.-On the other hand, any fields
in which drafting looms large are 'fields which suggest a more direct in-
fluence of law.
48 This presupposes effectiveness of the security devices employed. Cer-
tain ones of them, moreover, such as the trust receipt and the "equitable
pledge," lack the protection against fraud. They reach only for coverage
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primitive form of security (pawn) requires transfer of posses-
sion to the creditor; the more developed forms (mortgage, pledge
of bills of lading, e.g.) can transfer rights without disturbing
the physical things concerned. But it needs note that sociologi-
cally, and wholly irrespective of legal doctrine (doctrine, e.g.,
to the effect that property rights in specific things have been
transferred), the law of security here merges with the law of
contract; rights realizable only at a future time and unaccom-
panied by present enjoyment are own brothers of contract; their
enforcement in case of delinquency is likely, too, to require legal
process, or at least that regularized self-help in which the primi-
tive form of action "at law" persists. The same holds of im-
portant portions of the law of trusts, and of relationships gen-
erally which are affected by agreement (agency, bailment, and,
as has been indicated above, corporation) whether or not asso-
ciated with phases of property. The extent to which such legal
concepts do and can overlap in their function, according to his-
torical conditioning, of which much is accidental, is illustrated
by observing how little inherent necessity there is in our Anglo-
American limitation of security rights to "property," i.e., fixed
interests in specified assets of the debtor. Our own system knew,
and may know again, a time when certain classes of debts (spe-
cialities) took (as series A bonds might, in a blanket mort-
gage) general preference in the general assets of an individual,
and approached "property" by that much. And whereas the
German Grundschuld (as, occasionally, our own "equitable lien")
is almost purely a property concept, in that it gives security in
land up to a fixed amount although there is no personal debt
to secure, the English floating charge can be so set as to be not
too far removed from a first claim on income and in insolvency,
quite apart from immediate rights in any specified assets at all.
The judgment note provides in some of our states a general lien
on all lands of the debtor within the county, which, despite spa-
tial limitations, is curiously unproperty-like before any land has
been bought. Nonetheless, the idea of security being a "pro-
perty" matter is firmly enough ingrained in our legal system to
have results, and to force lawyers who are seeking security to
keep the specific (and present) character of the assets subject-
able in the forefront of their minds. Similarly, the mere con-
tract creditor must reckon with the possible elimination from
the general estate of an insolvent of all its vital assets, by way of
security to others. Which would be too obvious for mention if
it did not again raise the question of how far mere enforceability
of contract at law plays a part in current future deals.
against honest insolvency.-"Partially protected," in the text, because




Futztre Deals, Property and the Spot Market
Irrespective of that question, it is clear that current future
deals themselves, in their effect on the arrangement of economic
affairs, lie half-way between mere reliance on the general spot
market for either supplies or outlet, and property-wise assurance
of either outlet or supply by vertical integration. This, as to
goods, whether they be viewed as supplies or as merchandise.
On the side of services the situation is quite similar, but rather
more complex. Between "own unit" organization (property
plus an ownership and management set-up framed in good part
on contract, plus exclusive control of "agents" under a contract
set-up, and of a standing force of labor) and the rather uncom-
mon mere reliance on the general spot market (calling in the
plumber or the doctor for immediate action in emergency) lie
a short range letting out of individual jobs (contract to roof a
house) and a standing-relation contractual letting out of par-
ticular types of service (insurance coverage, deposit account,
legal or advertising counsel). Perhaps the same can be said as
to the supply of and outlet for working funds; yet when one is
again tempted to assume legal contract or even factual promises
as an utterly essential feature in our economy, it challenges
attention that so much of current financing proceeds on flexible
and revocable "understandings" as to line and conditions of
credit. And such flexibility is a marked trend in marketing of
goods as well, wherever long-range buyer-seller relation2s come
to seem more important than exact definition of the risks to
be shifted by the particular dicker in tcrms of quantity, quality,
or price. Output and requirement contracts, maximum and
minimum contracts, contracts with quality, quantity and kinds
to be specified from month to month, and sliding scale price
arrangements-these are symptomatic of an economy stabilizing
itself along new lines.
Contract andg Goiernment
But the power of contract is not pent within economic confines.
At need the directly economic aspects can without too great
harm be slighted, as the most familiar, as the easiest to see.
Not so the others.
Much of the growth of law itself is surely traceable to bar-
gain. Originally and still, arbitration of differences is by agree-
ment. Out of a practice of arbitration, originally and still, offi-
cial tribunals grow. Out of the results of arbitration, or of com-
promise, originally and still, come norms for future cases. Our
jury trial of fact-disputes was introduced by this same process
of agreement-though under vigorous urging of the Crown's of-
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ficers.4 1 Nor can one overlook the processes of constitution-mak-
ing, or of legislation.0 There is, too, "the social contract" as
a vital concept in political theory and political life (by "vital,"
I mean a concept which has vigorously influenced men's actions).
And if George Burton Adams' interpretation can be trusted, a
sort of social contract, the feudal constitution-making dicker be-
tveen King and vassal, was one of the living forces of English
constitutional, legal, even social life.rl Moreover, quite apart
from arbitration as a preliminary stage in inter-tribal,12 inter-
national or industrial government, there is the importance of
treaties as a major base of international law, and of group-bar-
gain as a basis of industrial (and commercial) relations. In
the international field the relation even to the technical law of
contract is intimate; interpretation relies peculiarly on private
law analogy. The industrial aspect carries us into another
sphere, not that of legal contract theory or technique, but that
of the social and political effects of contract, and especially of
contract as an instrument of unofficial government.
Group Self-Government and Contract
First, unofficial self-government. Official government, despite
its bewildering modern complexity, reaches patently but a minor
40 "Agreement" does not even today carry any necessary connotation of
real willingness. Acquiescence in the lesser evil is all that need be under-
stood. The problem of "reality of consent" is essentially one of determin-
ing what types of pressure or other stimuli are sufficiently out of line with
our general presuppositions of dealing to open the expression of agree-
ment to attack. "Economic duress" is still the order of the day save for
particular exceptions (usury, equity of redemption, duress of goods). Both
bona fide purchase for value after fraud, etc., and unwillingness to recog-
nize economic duress, seem to me impregnated strongly with recognition
that life and transactions must after all go on, upon whatever basis we
have at the moment. The one stresses highly legitimate expectations; the
other protects what may be conceived as illegitimate expectations; yet a
solid common core they have. In less sophisticated law the same common
core is again apparent, although coupled this time with the power of word-
magic or form-magic. If you have sealed and delivered, you are bound.
Unless you plead in words to the indictment, you simply cannot be tried.
You can be put to the peine forte et dure (life must go onI ours, if not
yours) but that produces neither trial nor conviction.-And compare the
terrific social pressures used to break down the one dissenter in one of the
Slavic group-householders, where unanimous- (verbal 1)-consent was
needed for new action. Truly "agreement" is an elusive concept. Yet it
will not do to judge of the bulk importance of rather solid real consent by
these marginal cases. See infra, in connection with System. And see
especially 2 WFIER, op. cit. supra note 6, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE §3.
5o Weber mentions the budget.
51 ADAMS, ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1920), esp. 167 if. and
notes. Social effects are to my mind a necessary inference from the au-
thor's position.
" VINOGRADOFF, op. cit. supra note 12, at c. X.
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fraction of the affairs of men in society. And on the side of
law it expressly leaves most of what it does not touch - open to
self-regulation-in good part, by "contract" (bargain, agreement,
initiative and acquiescence). It is convenient, for purposes of
description, to take over a distinction the European legal think-
ers have marked much more sharply and consistently than is
common with us: that between iron rules of public policy (e.g.:
there must be consideration or a seal to make an agreement en-
forceable; agreements running counter to the criminal law are
unenforceable) and the "yielding" rules which hold if, but only
if, there is no expression to the contrary. These latter rules
53As always in such discussion, I refer to "reaching" or "touching" With
some discernible directness. Hale's insistence (op. cit. supra, note 8) on
the really pervasive character of the indirect effects of putting govern-
mental force at the disposal of the Haves as distinct from the Have-nots
is never to be lost sight of. But it complements and does not contradict
what is here argued: that the ways of working inside the field thus marked
out are not touched by direct state government.
4 Our own distinction seems to me less clearly marked, first, because
"public policy" has been known to be mentioned in the process of "con-
struction;" second, because both kinds of rules are often referred to in-
discriminately as rules "of law" (cf. the sad confusion over whether "the
common law" is subject to abrogation by "custom"-surely a confusion that
this distinction, if taken, would clarify forever) ; third, because the second
type of rule travels with us under a variety of names--rules of construc-
tion, rules of presumption, etc.-which cannot with safety be taken as
wholly synonymous in any given context; and finally, because we have no
unambiguous accepted term at all to designate the first kind of rule. In a
word, we know the distinction, and it fits our law; we use it constantly, but
we have not systematized its use. This makes a case for borrowing. And
I think it should be added: nothing less than this does make a case for
outright borrowing. It is high time that American legal thinking should
arrive at a conscious and sociologically defensible working position in re-
gard to European legal thought. We have flea-jumped back and forth
between the extreme of deliberate ignorance and uninformed contempt or
dismissal, and the opposite extreme of undigested indiscriminate gulping.
There is little profit in either. It is almost universally true that our case-
training and earthy ad hoe legal sense offer important addition to a con-
tinental theory. It is very commonly true that even a wholly sound con-
tinental theory calls for remodelling in the light of our own data before it
is adequate for description of our law or of the processes of our law. It is
also very commonly true that even an unsound continental theory holds
stimulus for the understanding of our law. It is, then, distressing when
our foremost and least tradition-ridden jurist takes over for purposes of
conflicts questions a Roman concept of obligatio which lumps the post-
wrong situation in tort indiscriminately with the quite distinguishable pre-
wrong and post-wrong situations in contract. (This, very curiously, despite
a better insight, earlier. The Arrangement of the Law (1872) 7 A7t L.
Rnv. 46, 6 on. 1 (paternity acknowledged by personal communication)). The
home-grown color of his mind appears in its true creative power when he
cuts through the same notion of obligation and through that of duty, as in
the passages quoted supra note 39. Such an insight would be an achieve-
1931]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Isaacs has well described as themselves making up an official
standardized contract on a whole series of matters (pledge, sale,
partnership, etc.) subject to alteration by the parties. They
result in a curious and most useful combination of the values
derivable from status and from contract. Status-values, in that
a full set of obligation-incidents are available, worked out in
advance, to cover the hundred points the parties have had
neither time nor experience to consider. The pattern, almost
complete, is given. One can "adopt" the whole, as a going
whole. But contract-values, in that entrance on the state is
voluntary,r6 and especially in that a huge range of particular
modification and adaption is available -to any one with experi-
ence and skill to exploit the possibilities. When one adds the
field not covered in advance by well-settled rules, but open to
coverage by the parties, he finds available for use in self-govern-
ment an impressive apparatus. There is the large, though lim-
ited, number of "contract" or relation patterns, well worked out.
There are certain established' conditions and limitations on the
use of each pattern-yet the use of each is left highly flexible.
There is, to be sure, an observable tendency to regard the basic
accepted patterns as exclusively covering the whole field: if this
is not "a sale" it must be "an agency;" 51 if not "a share of
stock," it must be "a debt," or else be nothing 11 (compare the
Roman nominate contracts in their prime). But there is a no
less observable counter-tendency to enforce many novel types of
bargain more or less as made.
Yet Elu-lich has soundly argued that legal contract is in this
situation but a part of the picture. As contract to govern-
ment, so mere agreement-in-fact to contract; so also usage to
agreement-in-fact. In the self-government of sub-groups con-
tract provides an original frame-work, a constitution, a source
of ultimate sanction in dispute or break-down. From the ar-
ticles of association we learn that there are to be two trustees or
ten, that there is to be one secretary-treasurer or two offices to
fill; and if there be a row over management policy, or dissi-
dence in the church, the articles of association will for the crisis
loom into importance. But for the running of affairs they say
ment anywhere; but we might hope in advance for a thinker who could
do it, whereas the continent would have to take such a thinker as a sur-
prise. Their strength lies along other lines.
5 Op. cit supra note 3.
5 Here, however, one must dissent vigorously from Holmes' incautious
dictum: "As the relation of contractor and contractee is voluntary, the con-
sequences attaching to that relation must be voluntary." TtiE Colt0ioN
LAW 302.
7 Cf. Klaus, Sale, Agency and P'ice Maintenance (1928) 28 COL. L.
Rav. 312, 441.
z8 Cf. Note (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 65 (Heymsfeld).
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but little. The play of personality, the unrecorded adjustment
from day to day, further factual agreement from time to time,
informed by usage, and by initiative and acquiescence which do
not even call for conscious agreeing-these are what fill the con-
tract frame-work with a living content; these are what often
so stretch and overlay it as to make the initial contract a wholly
misleading guide to what occurs. Law and practice of corpora-
tions, factories, t-ade-unions, churches and households thus dif-
fer as do law and practice of the Constitution.
Government of Some by Others
Where the "self"-governmental bargain is driven between par-
ties who are consciously in partial opposition (labor and em-
ployer; insured and insurer; as contrasted with formation of
a family corporation or, perhaps, a cooperative) the legal aspects
of the bargain take on peculiar importance. Trouble is in the
offing. Law is more likely to be called upon. At the very least,
appeal to the group-constitution is more likely. Where bargain-
ing power, and legal skill and experience as well, are concen-
trated on one side of the type-transaction, even more so.
Standardized contracts in and of themselves partake of the
general nature of machine-production. They materially ease and
cheapen selling and distribution. They are easy to make, file,
check and fill. To a r~gime of fungible goods is added one of
fungible transactions-fungible not merely by virtue of sim-
plicity (the over-the-counter sale of a loaf of bread) but despite
complexity. Dealings with fungible transactions are cheaper,
easier. One interpretation of a doubtful point in court or out
gives clear light on a thousand further transactions. Finally,
from the angle of the individual enterprise, they make the
experience and planning power of the high executive available to
cheaper help; and available forthwith, without waiting through
a painful training period.'9
Where skill and power enter on one side only, however, the
situation changes. Law, under the drafting skill of counsel, now
turns out a form of contract which resolves all questions in ad-
vance in favor of one party to the bargain. It is a form of con-
tract which, in the measure of the importance of the particular
deal in the other party's life, amounts to the exercise of unofficial
government of some by others, via private law. The current in-
stallment contract for a pleasure car, or the current forms of
banker's collateral note are one-sided enough in all conscience.
Yet it is only in odd cases that their lop-sidedness gives rise to




government. The "servient" party0 has other holds for hand
and foot. Residence lease and oil lease begin to grow more vital
to the low contracting party. Factory employment, employment
in a company town or on a sugar beet farm, or farm-lease in
some share-cropping districts-these press to the point where
contract may mean rather fierce control.
Such pressure toward control means pressure toward remedy.
Yet the courts have been slow to see what was needed, or to
find means to fill the need. Beneath the surface of the opinions
one feels a persistent doubt-one feels it even while interference
proceeds-as to the wisdom of any interference with men's bar-
gains. Transactions must be certain. Where to draw the line?
Especially does the observer feel a timidity in the courts about
admitting any power to interfere, when no ready means appears
of setting wise and definite limits to the interference. I-low
different is the sure boldness with which an equity of redemp-
tion will be maintained despite all contract words (the outside
edge to which the court's axe will chop is already clearl) from
the tortuous approach to farm-machinery contracts,01 or even
to the bond of the professional surety company. Hence in the
main we have our interference case by case. And in the main
it moves by way of "construing" the particular language in
question not to have intended the result it did intend. Life
insurance is perhaps the classic instance. This procedure saves
the lesser bargainor for the moment, and salves the court's con-
science both as to justice and as to policy. Yet a specious salv-
ing. Such "construction" kills security in transactions, if "se-
curity" means predictability of actions at law. No man is safe
when language is to be read in the teeth of its intent. Nor is
even the party who is being protected safe, this side of final
judgment, in having got what he thinks he has bought (the
"life insurance as a commodity" suggestion). For such "con-
struction" often enough defeats itself. It begins by admitting
power in the parties (in the dominant party) to make their
dicker as they wish. Sooner or later that admission will be
taken seriously; sooner or later men will be held to the very type
of thing which prior courts have conceived as too outrageous to
be admitted as intent.2  Meantime the greater bargainor, de-
00 Wright, op. cit. supra note 8; and cf. Morris Cohen, op. cit supra
note 8.
61 Note (1928) 28 CoL. L. RBu. 466 (Heymsfeld).
02 1 should have no criticism of this case-to-case procedure if it were di-
rected at what seems to me to be the true issue: finding and marking out
type-situations in which limits of permissible bargaining require to be laid
down; or finding and marking out types of parties who require to be limited
in their bargain-play with each other-and then spotting what the needed
limitations are. With such an objective the case-to-case procedure can
work to beautiful results, avoiding premature definition, accumulating ex-
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feated once and again, recurs to the attack. After each case he 3
perience, yet meeting current needs. But in the newer lop-sided contracts
the courts make little headway in the process because they do not see the
goal. Contrast with this the successive struggles over establishment and
preservation of an equity of redemption. Contrast-almost unique among the
newer contract forms-the refreshing judicial attempts to discover limits
below which the trustee of a corporate mortgage simply lacks power to con-
tract out of responsibility. Cf. Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the
Carparate Indenture (1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 198; and cf. In re Fulton
Trust Co., N. Y. L. J., June 25, 1930 (N. Y. Surr. Ct., 1930). Against
such soundly oriented groping set, e.g., the seed-warranty eases. Cf. 12
CALF. L. REv. 523 (1924); also LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MLATEnLUS ON TilE
LAW OF SALES (1930) 260 if. To me it seems clear that the essential pur-
pose of the non-warranty clause is the avoidance of consequential damages
measured by lost crops. Such a purpose is intelligible and legitimate;
whether it offers the best machinery of risk-distribution is not now the
question. But surely it is equally clear that the buyer is entitled to some-
thing and that what he is entitled to should at least resemble in appearance
the seed ordered, and, finally, and at least on pain of price refund, that he
is entitled to diligent efforts by the seller to see that what is delivered fits
the description under which his order was given-if not filled. One might
properly add a res ipsa loquitur rule as to breach of duty when alfalfa
turns out to be turnip. The proper judicial aim seems to me to be here the
fixing-as in the mortgage situations--of a basic minimum which the bar-
gain carries merely by virtue of being a bargain of that type. But that
would imply a limitation on contractual capacity, an idea that raises
prickles on the scalp-wherever tradition has not already hallowed it.
Hence the seed cases wander back and forth between the sudden imposi
tion of consequential damages despite the clause, by virtue of some accident
which closed the negotiation before the non-warranty took effect, and flat
refusal of recovery, apparently of any sort, because the non-warranty bites
in. Interesting is the English use of the distinction between warranty and
condition to evade'lop-sided drafting in such eases.
•63 Too late for remedy I note that this whole paper is thrown off center
by failure to carry throughout the discussion an awareness of the group-
wise (as contrasted with an individualistic) structure of society. What is
needed is constant discrimination between (1) single individuals and what
can commonly though not always be lumped with them, household units;
and (2) groups, i. e., numbers of individuals organized into some inter-
locking unity of action; and (3) classes, i. e., numbers of individuals in
like circumstances, with like interests, reacting in much the same way to
like stimuli, but not organized (domestic consumers of sugar, c. g., as dis-
tinct from a consumer's cooperative.) And as to groups, a distinction must
be carried through (a) between fairly permanent group-building (a going
business corporation) and semi-antagonistic corporation for the moment
(the single bargain; the steady-customer relation lies half way between;
indeed, even the customer-to-be-expected is in one aspect part of the selling
group-cf. legal recognition of goodwill); and (b) between the managing
personnel of a group the working personnel, and the more inert group-
public (e. g., absentee stockholders). An effective and sustained integration
of such a view of group-wise structure with the subject of the paper, and
of both together with the property-system, is difficult not so much because
it leads to any overwhelming complexity as because our knowledge in each
field is traditionally cast in words whose whole suggestive force runs toward
excluding other and no less familiar bodies of knowledge from simul-
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can redraft and fight again. A single victory, if achieved, has
good chance of being permanent. Legislative intervention, pro-
hibiting certain clauses and prescribing others, may remedy
this. If it survives. For it does not "construe," it prescribes,
it limits contractual capacity, and so comes under attack for
unconstitutionality along the same lines of thought and decision
which have made recourse to the legislature necessary. 4 Where
admitted, legislative action offers the great value (as in the in-
surance and labor instances) of possible limitation to definite
matters in which regulation is shown by experience to be needed,
A result less easy of accomplishment under the common law-
as long as men drive on in the search, at all hazards, for broad
and verbally simple rules. Even where both courts and legisla-
tion fail, competition may-as somewhat in the cases of life in-
surance ahd the oil lease-contribute toward readjustment of
the bargain along more balanced lines. In general, however, the
tendency when standardized contracts are used has seemed even
in such highly competitive spheres as installment sales, residence
leases, investments, and commercial banking to be rather the
borrowing and accumulation of seller-protective instead of cus-
tomer-protective clauses. A fortiori when, as in the labor field,
competitive pressure on the bargain-drafter weakens.
Unenforceable Agreements
Any attempt by officials to take account of the social implications
of agreements, tb stir any other policy-flavor at all into the uni-
versal soup-stock of "give 'em what they've called for," cuts into
the broader field of the use of law to enforce or buttress taboos
on particular types of conduct. The widest laissez-faire will find
some limits in the criminal law. Even in racketeering, distinc-
tions are recognized between establishing and pirating the es-
tablished. But surely there are few features of our system which
bring out more sharply the need for getting on, on the one hand,
and the feeling of normality, almost inevitability, of legal pro-
mise-enforcement, on the other, than the attitude of the civil
courts toward agreements which run counter to the criminal
law. If performed, the performance stands. Par dclictum is a
respectable rationalization in any scheme of things which puts
the burden of inducing action on the plaintiff; it may also have
been a cause. But surely the ground-tone of the letting alone is
the same which runs through accord and parol satisfaction of
sealed obligations, through the law of de facto officials, of pay-
ments under mistake of law, of bona fide purchase, of res judi-
taneous consideration. So, peculiarly, the vicious heritage of regularly
viewing "parties" to a deal as single individuals.
64Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454.
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cata, and of vested rights. We must get onz. We cannot be for-
ever reopening.- On the other hand, the executory illegal agree-
ment is unenforceable. Par delictum, or refusal of law officials
to lend themselves to action counter to law's policy-neither rea-
son nor rationalization bulks so large as the obvious sense that
here a penalty on action is being inflicted by withdrawing what
as of course could otherwise be had, what as of course men are
conceived to desire, and count on, and be worried at not getting.
All of which etches even more sharply when one comes to agree-
ments unenforceable merely as counter to policy-to support a
mistress, to induce another to break a contract, to restrain trade
unreasonably at common law. And here it pays to distinguish
whole-hog unenforceability from the approach discussed above,
that in terms first, of adverse "construction" when the content
of a clause seems socially unwanted, and second, in development
of the same approach, the knocking out of single clauses in par-
ticular transaction-types: clauses barring suit for carrier's negli-
gence and the like (and compare statutory limitations on wage-
assignments). In these last the policy is equilibration of the
bargain, not discouragement of the bargain-type. The road is
via "If, then," not via "No ;" via limitation and not denial of
capacity. One suspects, too, a psychological similarity with that
positive approach to public policy which still plays its due part
in our law: the seizing on an express promise to help toward
enforceability of an obligation felt, but not yet felt strongly
enough to stand alone. I have mentioned above the cases on
natural objects of bounty. I am no historian; but I seem to
find a similar situation at the opening of the 17th century,
when antecedent requests not yet adequate for tacit contract or
quasi-contract were being made "consideration." 6 -- How much
effect the flat "No" rulings have, in the large, is dubious indeed,
except as inducing bribees, for instance, to insist on cash.67 The
r5 Compare Holmes' illumination of limitations and prescription. COL-
LEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 198 ff.
66 Cf. Sidenham and Worlington's Case, 2 Leon. 224 (1585); Bosden v.
Thinne, Yelv. 40 (1603); Lampleigh v. Braithwait, Moore K. B. 86G,
(1616). Ai~ms, CASES ON SURETYSHIP (1901) 498, 533, shows indemnity
and contribution recognized in 1687 by the custom of London-i.e., in
established non-legal obligation; indemnity in Chancery in 1032; contribu.
tion strongly suggested in the Court of Requests in 1613, and certain in
Chancery in 1629. In these cases, as in quantum meruit, it therefore
shortly became unnecessary to worry about the promise as "having
reference to the first request." And it may be suggested that the introduc-
tion of the request idea at all was only a somewhat inept way of search,
first for a rationalization, and second for a delimiting objective marl: (Hunt
v. Bate stood in the way) in regard to a development still groping for di-
rection.
67 The case of usury has been most discussed. See RADIx, THE Lkv;WFUL
PURSUIT OF GAIN (19100) c. II and citations.
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bearing of the cases seems rather to be on the ideology of courts
as to their office, and on some processes of case-law growth.
Conclusions on the Place of Contract
In the more clearly vital field of lop-sided standardized agree-
ments, it is obvious, but needs eternal emphasis, that the life-
meaning of the legal set-up is affected seriously by factors other
than the remedies directly available at law. An insurer, though
discharged at law, may reinstate the policy, may even pay, as
a matter of business policy. A landlord or banker may never
resort to his ironclad document save when for extraneous rea-
sons the other party proves unworkable. 8 Meticulous insistence
on every detail of a construction or even merchandizing contract
can almost be guaranteed to force the contractor into default.
The problem is therefore seldom one of a practice of tyranny
(contrast the loan-shark). It is rather a problem of legal power
which makes tyranny possible at arbitrary will-a terrific in-
stance being the dispossession of the customary tenants by the
highland Scottish clan heads, as legal owners.09 On the other
hand, the legal remedy directly available may not even suggest
the extent of the legal power which derives from an ideology of
"contract" in a given situation. The impairment of contract
clause and the liberty of contract conception protect from gov-
ernmental interference not only existing contractual advantages
but mere expectation thereof, and protect them equally in cases,
such as agreements with wage-earners, where the direct legal
remedy may be illusory. So also (e.g., as against attempts at
organization of a shop) with the injunction against "inducing
breach," which has in some courts carried over even into such
cases of employment at will as in themselves no lawyer would
admit to constitute "contract" at all.
7
0
To sum up, the major importance of legal contract is to pro-
vide a frame-work for well-nigh every type of group organiza-
68 Ehrlich mentions the Prussian domain leases as thus administered, but
the question would remain, whether, e.g., political opinions might not show
the man to be unworkable.
BJeudwine's account, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY AND TIHE LAND
(1918) c: XXXVI, however tendentious, seems substantially trustworthy.
The instance involves neither standardization nor contract, but the sub.
stitution of an individualistic concept of title for the status-relatilon of
clan chief. Yet the application to any wide divergence of the legal from'
the non-legal situation on the same facts is clear.
70 Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HAnv. L. RBv. 663; c.
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). For a con-
trasting example of contract ideology taken over cannily, open-eyed, and
used for all it could offer, but without the user being at all misled by it,
see Holmes' opinion in Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379,
24 Sup. Ct. 107 (1903).
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tion and for well-nigh every type of passing or permanent rela-
tion between individuals and groups, up to and including states
-a frame-work highly adjustable, a frame-work which almost
never accurately indicates real working relations, but which af-
fords a rough indication around which such relations vary, an
occasional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal
when the relations cease in fact to work. The trend toward
standardization, despite its values where power is balanced,
raises doubts as to policy where its effects are lop-sided, because
the norm of ultimate appeal is then so tremendously deflected to
the one side. The direct legal sanctions are not the major meas-
ure of importance. Their effect as a threat is uncertain. In the
credit field, they break down in the case of greatest need, unless
strenothened by security. And indirect sanctions-at least in
the case of "inducing breach"-or indirect effects by way of
ideology and marginal operation, may lie close to the heart of the
protection sought.
III. SOME TECHNICAL PHASES AND THEIR BEARING
Primitive contract law, whether because economic ideas are un-
developed or because legal machinery is clumsy, is affected
strongly by elements of vengeance-which obviously pre-
supposes the Schuld idea-and of high forfeit-which as has
been indicated carries no such necessary presupposition. Seiz-
ing the debtor's body; even, very early, killing him; debt-slav-
ery; penalties and forfeitures; "taking it out of his hide"-these
have persisted into modern times. With prohibition of slavery
and peonage, abolition of imprisonment for debt, refusal of
courts to enforce penalties although expressly agreed upon, all
buttressed by usury legislation and limitations on the transfer
of wages and future property, modern law moves definitely onto
the basis of reparation for breach as the main purpose of legal
remedy. Specific reparation-which, it will be noted, presup-
poses that the defendant has the wherewithal to perform-we
have limited largely to the case of land. In the case of irre-
placeable personal services we seek a compromise -with the peon-
age-prohibition by enjoining against a competing employment
and against inducement. The normal remedy for breach-which
means its normal meaning in law-remains for us damages.
Our trouble is chiefly that our rules have so over-rigidified (espe-
cially on the amazingly naive assumption of a frictionless mar-
ket) that the remedy is often inadequate, even when realized.
The rules in Germany and the legal practice in England, allow-
ing the plaintiff to go on the market and cover, and then to hold
the defendant to compensation thus measured, offer a fairly ade-
quate adjustment; one, too, which our courts permit parties to
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achieve by a proper clause-provided they know of the need, and
can think how to meet it. But in any event there will be a delay
in reparation for which legal interest is no compensation to a
business man. Even apart from insolvency of the obligor, there-
fore, the legal remedy continues to appear as in essence a last
resort device, adequate only to assure the promisor that all he
can gain by breach is delay. This can hardly be regarded as de-
terrence from breach. The heavy drive toward actual perform-
ance must thus be sought outside the law; though the law, e. g.,
by way of an ideology of "duty" in general, and "legal duty"
in particular, does undoubtedly contribute to such outside drives.
Such a view is reinforced by the customary performance in
fact of legally nugatory or unenforceable promises-a practice
ingrained as to some types ("firm" offers, oral modifications of
formal writings), more frequently found than not as to certain
others (promises to provide for dependents), and widespread as
to many other types (repayment by a discounting endorser
discharged by delay in protest, etc.) In no legal system are all
promises enforceable; people and courts have too much sense.
In all legal systems the effort is to find definite marks which
shall at once include the promises which ought to be enforceable,
exclude those which ought not to be, and signalize those which
will be. On this third side particular forms and rules are likely
to continue effective even when they have ceased to serve the two
other purposes. And obviously, of wise inclusion and exclusion,
one may be well done when the other is not. In the wide open
spaces where seals were seals, and certainly after duress, fraud
and the like had become cognizable in Phahcery, the likelihood
is strong that the seal made an excellent positive test for en-
forceability, and certainly at common law a clear one."1 The
same holds of such other obligation forms as recognizance, or in
Europe the formal recording of an obligatory writing by a nota-
rial officer.-2 But certainly as to the seal all assurance that the
71 Of the Roman nominate contracts the same holds. The truly formal
contracts, standardized on form alone, correspond to our seal. The nomi-
nate contracts, standardized on type-situations (sale, loan with transfer of
title, bailment). correspond rather to our relations giving rise to actions:
debt after delivery of goods, or money, detinue or case out of bailment,
assumpsit out of agency, warranty in conjunction with sale, etc. When the
relation is heavily standardized, express promise, tacit promise, and obliga-
tion constructive in tort, "contract," or equity are exceedingly difficult to
differentiate. Which is not surprising: the categories named presuppose
in part a discreetness in the facts which is non-existent.--Holmes urges
that the charter, writing, is used before the seal, with us, and not as a
matter of pure form, but as a matter of good proof. Tjiz COMMoN LAW
271. The seal then strengthens the proof; in due course to muscle its way
in as an exclusive criterion.
72 One still hopes for some one to undertake a study of the degeneration of
our office of notary, historically, comparatively, and functionally, and with
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positive test is a wise one vanishes when printed forms contain-
ing "[L.S.]" are simply executed on the dotted line. And even
if one should be tempted to take enforcement of a signed writing
as a base-line of policy, the signed printing would raise imme-
diate question. More troublesome, however, than the mere
problem of enforceability (and an extreme instance of the di-
vergence of legal and non-legal measurement of obligation) is
the persistence of archaic and arbitrary incidents in promises
effective purely through their ancient form.-3  So the rule
against alteration by a transaction of less high dignity-Le., less
ancient pedigree-or the complications attending unsealed au-
thority to execute an instrument under seal. In one instance
the archaic rule has been linked through an almost fantastic
concatenation to a purpose distinctly modern. (1) A warranty
deed is in some states technically essential to assure a purchaser
full status, and in many more is the customary method of con-
veyance. (2) An undisclosed principal, by another technicality,
can commonly be held on deals in which he is not named.
(3) Real estate operators often want secrecy to make their
coups, and want rights on a purchase contract both without in-
corporation and without responsibility; and when the law-day
on the resale has.passed want profits in pocket safe from attack.
(4) By enlisting the seal both on agreement to buy and on their
deed when selling, and thrusting forward a strawman in both
transactions, they turn an archaism to the most modern of ends,
and have their will.74  Judgments on the policies involved must
be left to those who know the law and practice of real estate,
reference not only to contract, but to property and procedure. Such a
study would open up, and require to Jbe done in the light of, the whole
question of prescribed forms and of recording system; but we shall under-
stand neither completely until we know what notaries are abroad, and
what their workings mean; what they have been in our system; and how
they became what they now are.
73This obviously need not hold of all formal promises. It is rather a
function of the archaic state of the law when particular formal promises
were taking shape. It presupposes, too, that informal promises have since
grown into recognition. Otherwise "the" contract-type would come under
vigorous pressure for renovation, which is unlikely when the pressure is
deflected into producing a satisfactory informal type of obligation.m-Henco
if Mr. Williston's Written Obligations Act should now be introduced, one
would expect it to run relatively free of troubles which afflicb seals in this
respect. It would on the other hand, make the problems of lop-sided bar-
gaining even more acute.
Compare Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925),
against the background of Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357 (1876) (itself
a case where lines of budding growth were faced, and checked), Harris v.
Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572 (1921) and Lagumis v. Gerard, 116
Mlisc. 471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1921). And compare CArDozo,
PARADoxEs oF LEGAL SCmNCE (1928) 70.
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with a suggestion that Veblen" as well as the United Realtors
deserves a hearing. The need here is merely to observe that
neither antiquity nor apparent out-of-lineness with present
trends in law at large gives any certainty that a particular seem-
ing anomaly is today either burdensome or useless. Only prac-
tice holds the material for an answer to such a question. To
which the further observation joins, that if the rule in question
should prove really vital to real estate development, that would
yet seem of itself little reason for retaining it as a rule on
."sealed obligations" at large; the izeason, however good, would
cease when the transaction ceased to involve land.
Informal Promises
But more important to a commercial economy than the stilted-
ness of formality is the question of informal promises. It is
commonly said that their enforcement is essential to a business
world; the statement sounds too simple to be probable, unless
by "informal" is meant simply "not involving elaborate ritual."
The Romans did come to admit suits on book accounts. The
Greeks developed actions on written promises (synallagma).
Modern Continental law admits a suit-in general-on any
promise with a proper causa; and causa seenis to mean, very
roughly, any justification in policy which warrants recognition
by a court.70 All of this indicates that it would be hard for any
business system to develop or to get on if legal enforcement were
conditioned on the ceremony with the copper and the scales, or
on procuring the three official old men to watch and witness the
hand clasp, or-save such transactions as are more elephantine,
perhaps, e.g., those involving, realty-on official recording of
agreements made. But when we see the great exchanges devis-
ing means for exchanging written and signed memoranda of
sales of grain and stocks-and, so far as an outsider can deter-
mine, profiting by the necessity-the notion that speed requires
utter informality loses cogency. Indeed there would be no
apparent loss in efficiency if all the memorandum slips used on
exchanges had to carry in the lower right-hand corner a printed
"seal," and if the business stationery now used for confirming
oral deals between merchants were similarly ornamented. And
the practice" of immediate confirmation has sufficiently developed
to make a case for the position that limiting enforceability to
signed promises would do no violence to the business side of our
economy-at least, as to the initiation of contract. Surface in-
dications are that the effects as between solvent contractors
might rather be healthy than otherwise. There would be some
75 E.g., ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923) c. VII.
76 Cf. Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 8.
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reduction in telephone dealings with persons lacking established
reputation. There would be troubles, even in the case of estab-
lished reputation and honesty, where death or insolvency of the
one obligor supervened. Yet neither inconvenience would be so
material as not to offer some hope of being outveighed by the
gain in adequacy and unambiguity of proof. As a conclusion,
then: a business economy demands a means of quick, not one of
"informal" contracting.
Consideration
But with us the machinery evolved fits both descriptions;" the
much discussed requirement, and sufficiency, of a consideration.
In purpose consideration surely approximates closely the rough
description given above of causa: any sufficient justification for
court-enforcement. In broad effects, that purpose is accom-
plished. In detail, however, the machinery is embarrassed by
a number of rules not too well designed to meet the purpose, yet
sufficiently crystallized to make continuous trouble in such cases
as involve them.
Neither causes nor processes of the development of the con-
sideration concept are at all clear in detail. We do not know
how the Germanic system of awarding what one may speak of as
the advantage of proof to the apparently sounder side came to
degenerate into the debt-defendant's power as of right to swear
himself out of judgment. We do not know whether the fear of
stout swearers or the growth of commercial transactions was the
more vital factor in developing assumpsit; we know little if any-
thing of the details of the latter pressure on the courts from, say,
77 I quarrel but little with Holmes' welcome insight: "Consideration is a
form as much as a seal. The only difference is, that one form is of mod-
ern introduction, and has a foundation in good sense, or at least falls in
with our common habits of thought, so that we do not notice it, vhereas the
other is a survival from an older condition of the law, and is less mani-
festly sensible, or less familiar." THE C0MmoN LAW 273. Nor with his
development of the position: "In my opinion no one will understand the
true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental ques-
tions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal,
that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of the two
minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs--
not on the parties having meant the same thing, but on their having said
the same thing. CoLLEcTED LEGAL PAPms 178. Contracts are indeed oc-
casionally formal in this second sense, and in a business economy doubtless
need to be. Consideration can be conceived as a form, in every instance,
and is quite" plainly such, in many. Yet less extreme language gives a
truer picture. "Form" is a more useful concept in the present connection
when it is limited to some such meanink as either (a) one particular
necessary way of doing the thing, for legal effect, among several ways
(all known to practice) of doing the same thing if law be not considered;
or (b) a way of doing which must be added to what would be done anyhow.
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1570 to 1620.78 We do not know in any clarity the process by
which the case-misfeasance-tort root and the quid-pro-quo root
out of debt were built together. What is clear, is the emergence
of a current definition in terms of benefit to the promisor or
detriment to the promisee as the agreed equivalent and inducing,
cause of fhe promise; a definition which purports both to show
what is adequate and what is necessary to a successful action in
assumpsit or its heirs. The current formulation has the merit
of covering most cases, even if it does not cover all. Indeed it is
obvious that as soon as the arbitrary but utterly necessary logi-
cal jump is made, of making mutual promises serve to support
each other, the great bulk of business promises are comfortably
cared for.
Four troublesome classes of cases remain. There are busi-
ness promises such as "firm offers," understood to be good for a
fixed time, but revoked before. They are frequent; they are and
should be relied on. As to them our consideration doctrine is
badly out of joint. Closely related in orthodox doctrine, less so
in practice, is the second class: promises which call for accept-
ance by extended action (such as laying twenty miles of track),
revoked while the work is in process. A third and hugely im-
portant class is that of either additional or modifying business
promises made after an original deal has been agreed upon. Law
and logic go astray whenever such dalings are regarded as truly
comparable to new agreements. They are not. No business man
regards them so. They are going-transaction adjustments, as
different from agreement-formation as are corporate organiza-
tion and corporate management; and the line of legal dealing
with them which runs over waiver and e stoppel is based on
sound intuition. The fourth main trouble-making class has only
a doctrinal connection with business; it lies chiefly in the field of
family affairs; it includes the promise made and relied on, but
which did not bargain for reliance, and in the case of promises
to provide it laps over into the third party beneficiary problem.
As to all of these classes but the first, a distinct but very uneven
tendency is observable in the courts to strain by one dodge or
another toward enforcement. That tendency is healthy. It
may be expected to increase. It has already had some effects on
orthod6x doctrine, 79 and may be expected to have more. Mean-
while the first class mentioned goes largely untouched.
When one attempts to estimate the net value of the considera-
For otherwise form so fits into common habits a-) not to require attention
from any but philosophers and ethnographers.
78 Goebel suggests to me that -the failure of the Church courts to do an
effective job with laesio,fidei adds mightily to the suction which draws as-
sumpsit forth.
79 E.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1927) §§ 45, 90, 135.
[Vol. 40
WHAT PRICE CONTRACT?
tion requirement the first step is to repeat that it does fit most
normal cases in life, that it gives trouble only on the fringes.
As a test of what promises iwt to enforce, it must be regarded as
somewhat formalistic. The existence of bargain equivalency
does indeed commonly evidence positively that the promise was
deliberate-considered-meant. Such equivalency gives also
fair ground for believing that some promise was in fact made;
and thereby much reduces the danger from possible perjury, and
even from misunderstanding. The giving of a bargain equiva-
lent, be it by promise or by action, is furthermore an excellent
objective indication not only of the creation of expectation in the
promisee, but of the reasonableness of there being expectation,
and of its being related to the promise. (And the size of the
equivalent may help to "interpret" the expectation.) Yet it will
be observed that the handing over of a signed promise in writing
(which is not enough for enforcement) would go far in most cir-
cumstances"0 to assure the same values; no lawyer, e.g., can fail
to be struck by the closeness with which exemptions from the re-
quirement of writing under the statute of frauds are related to
the presence of unambiguous consideration which is substantial-
ly equivalent in fact to the promise claimed.5' Nor is it appar-
ent why in many cases deliberateness, due assurance that the
promise was made and relied on, and properly so, might not all
5' Not in all. We have as yet but the barest inklings of the policy con-
siderations involved in printed forms, or in the signing by the one party of
a document prepared by the other in advance.
The problem introduces again that most misunderstood of cases, Pillans
v. Van Mlierop, 3 Burr. 1663 (1765). There consideration is discussed as
an assurance of deliberateness, and by M1ansfield as a matter of evidence
(i.e., assurance that a promise has been made?) : "for when it is reduced
into writing, as in covenants, specialties, bonds, etc., there was no objec-
tion to the want of consideration." Mlansfield did also inquire in argument
"if any case could be found, where the undertaking holden to be a nudum
pactum was in writing." Yet all the opinions, and Mlansfield's in particu-
lar, stress not writing in general, but writing in mercantile transactions,
and the absence of a requirement of consideration among merchants. And
all stress that this particular case was one of an engagement to honor
bills. If the narrow issue decision in that case needs vindication, it should
be fairly well evidenced by the modern decisions on letters of credit; allow-
ing for changed conditions of finance the parallel is amazing. The mer-
cantile promise position at large is unnecessary, though Mansfield probably
meant it, and probably as matters then stood, did well to. But where is
there warrant for the common assertion that Lord Mlansfield tried to make
all written promises, or all promises deliberately made, good? I find myself
in accord with Lord Denman's remarks: "I do not find this language
ascribed to him by any reporter, and do not know whether we are to receive
it as a traditional report, or as a deduction from what he does appear to
have laid down." Eastwood v. Keynon, 11 A. & E. 438 (1840). And with
Buller's on another issue: "Lord Mansfield did not decide commercial cases
so."
s, LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930) 916 ff.
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be evidenced by circumstances apart from either writing or con-
sideration. The problem is acute only within the family. Out-
side, a writing might well be made a condition to "reasonable-
ness" of any reliance; though very possibly, as with the statute
of frauds on sales an exception might be needed for pretty trans-
actions. All in all, then, as a test for non-enforcement, our con-
sideration requirement must be regarded as not yet wholly just
ko our needs.
As a positive test, a test for what promises to enforce, the
same must be said. For here the requirement of the positive
law runs in terms not of factual equivalency, but of formal
equivalency under the bargain as stated. A consideration which
in fact is largely, even wholly formal, may be enough; release of
injury-claim for a dollar. This is well enough when the promise
is one whose enforcement is in itself socially desirable: a charita-
ble subscription, a promise to provide for a child on marriage, an
option to buy land. And it is enforcement in such cases which
has given foothold for the draftsmen in cases of a-socially-
different character. But when the courts in such cases recog-
nize in general language the adequacy of thoroughly formal con-
sideration, they obscure the problem discussed above, as to gov-
ernment by contract; the same problem so clearly seen by the
courts in usury and mortgage cases, and by the legislature in
regulation of employment: that of discrepancy in bargaining
power and semi-duress in fact. Though obscured, that problem
recurs. It is therefore not surprising that the last quarter cen-
tury has seen-in business cases-the incursion into the doctrine
of consideration of a further doctrine of so-called "mutuality"
whereby particular promises are matched off against each
other, and some equivalency in fact (e.g., to buy if the other
party has agreed to sell) frequently insisted on, even when for-
mally adequate consideration is present.2 It is to be expected
that this tendency will continue: and it is not unlikely that it
will develop, as in the past, peculiarly to relieve the weaker bar-
gainer. The lop-sidedness of bargain-result is thus taken as the
mark of lop-sidedness of bargain-making. But the motivation
being apparently not wholly conscious, the result has been (as
so often during case-law growth) confusion in doctrine and un-
certainty in outcome; and-natural enough in a business econ-
omy-a relief of smaller business men which finds little counter-
part in the case of the laborer.
82 1 speak, be it noted, of mutuality at law, and in terms of apparently
reasonable equivalency of performances promised, and neither of mutual
promises as consideration, nor of illusory promises, nor of mutuality as a
consideration to specific performance. Although all of these last, and es-
pecially the finding, or refusal to find, tacit counter-promises in aid or de-
feat of an action, are a phase of the same tendency. Cf. Note (April




Closely related to the values and presuppositions of the consid-
eration doctrine are other phases of contract law, notably the
doctrines of implied conditions. Indeed, so far as conditions are
constructed not out of what the parties promised, but out of the
nature of the case, one may feel this branch to be more deeply
impregnated with the equivalency-idea than is the other. Yet
with a difference. For whereas the broad issue--"enforceabil-
ity or not"-may hope to trace some discernible lines on the fea-
tures of society, such narrower questions, as to the conditions
courts will create, tend to show a deal more of the influence of
men's ways on the law than of law on the ways of men8 3
One begins at all events, as so often, with Holmes: "You
always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you
imply it?"84 And with regard to concurrent conditions and fail-
ure of consideration it seems obvious that the why is a concep-
tion of equivalency of substance rather than merely of form-
though within such formal limits as the parties themselves have
set if they have bargained a little for a much.E So far one is
doubtless still in the field of reading tacit agreement. If the
parties did not actually think thus, they at least had generalized
and hardly mistakable attitudes which needed but the pointing
of attention and the sharpening of wits to reach these same re-
sults. Until courts acquire a willingness to take in commercial
understanding (merchantability and the like) we do have a
problem here; otherwise not. The more perplexing question lies
rather in what seem to be "express" conditions, where doubt
arises as to whether the common reading prescribed by commer-
cial sense for the type of case has not been overridden by delib-
erate negation of the parties. Express-hence deliberate-and
hence to be given effect; a tricky conclusion, and one which, as
is suggested above, courts are wisely far from always indulging,
although neither they nor any writer have yet found the means
to tell when they will, or when they should.
Vastly different, as has often been pointed out, is the situation
3 1 let this statement stand with great hesitation. As to doctrines of
conditions in general it seems fairly safe. But as to the effects of decisions
on conditions in many particular types of contract, especially in thos3 sub-
ject to drafting work, it seems absurd. Weber overemphasizes these last.
84 COLLECTED LEGAL PArE-S 181.
85 HOLmS, THn COMMON LAW 336 (as indeed all through his discussion
of contract-scope) insists on failure of description, i.e., of getting the thing
promised, as an element distinct from failure of equivalency. So far as
true interpretation is the goal, the technical measurement of the promises
made is a sounder, because more definite, guide than any equivalency idea.
The latter is useful, however, in both seeing why courts depart either from
literal into true interpretation (e.g., constructive concurrent conditions) or
especially from true interpretation into the wielding of the axe.
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when we approach constructive conditions bottomed on the un-
forseen. Not agreement, but fairness, is then the goal of inquiry.
This holds of impossibility, and of frustration; it holds of mis-
take (whether urged to excuse or to ground a new promise of
extra compensation). In all of these the question runs to the
effect of unforeseen events or discoveries which destroy some
presupposition of the deal. The effort is in essence to mark out
a range and an apportionment of risks assumed; or more accu-
rately, of risks to be imposed. But I do not think it far-fetched
to urge that in that marking out, equivalency-ideas, though far
from being the exclusive factor, have played a major roleP0
One could ascribe remedies for fraud and misrepresentation
unhesitatingly to the same equivalency-complex (I use the term
with its anthropological, not with its Freudian connotation) if
doctrines, and apparently effects, similar to ours were not found
in systems ignorant of consideration. Yet the hesitation need
be but momentary. Where equivalence is expected, where it is
bargained for, any developed system may be expected to condi-
tion legal pressure to perform on receipt of the return agreed.
If effective fraud or misrepresentation goes to a presupposition of
the deal, it will be a presupposition on which the objecting
party's return depended. Duress, too, fits the picture well
enough: a man has been made to promise without the return
we assume he would have wanted. Yet I suspect the approach
in that case to travel a more rugged road, allied to the concept of
the Peace.
Prophylactic Form 'I
But just as no system of promise-enforcement can do its work
without taking account of the fact that existence of forms com-
monly sufficient to enforcement may be produced by illicit means,
so no system may ignore the value of forms as records and
86 Holmes' statement of the issue, though clothed too largely in terms of
parties' intent, is still classic: "The immediate legal effect of what the
promisor does is, that he takes the risk of the event, within certain defined
limits, as between himself and the promisee." THE CoMiMiON LAW 300.
"The price paid in mercantile contracts generally excludes the construction
that exceptional risks were intended to be assumed." Ibid. 303. "The
most important element of decision is not any technical, or even any general
principle of contracts, but a consideration of the nature of the particular
transaction as a practical matter." Ibid. 337. What Holmes means by this
is the most vigorous manipulation of doctrine to achieve the results needed
by practical business. Compare his study Grain Elevators (1872) 6 Am L.
REv. 455, paternity acknowledged, 2 KENT COMMENTARIES (12th ed. by
Holmes 1873) *492, note 1, at end.
For development of related views see Corbin, Conditions in the Lau; of
Contract (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 729; Patterson, Judicial Freedom of Imt-
:plying Conditions in Contracts, in the forthcoming G6ny Memorial volume.
87 See especially 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923).
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vouchers that a deal has actually been made, or their importance
as permanent and reckonable evidence of what was agreed upon
in that deal. Contracts are transactions, not mere events; and,
as deliberate transactions, are capable of prophylactic regula-
tion; since they are transactions relied upon, men have an inter-
est in predictable security as to their legal effects. Hence for a
variety of transactions, and by no means an ill chosen assort-
ment, the statute of frauds requires for enforceability a memo-
randum of the essential terms, signed by tle borrower.
That statute is an amazing product. In it de Leon might
have found his secret of perpetual youth. After two centuries
and a half the statute stands, in essence better adapted to our
needs than when it first was passedBs By 1676 literacy (which
need imply no great consistency in spelling) may well have been
expected in England of such classes as would be concerned in
the transactions covered by the statute's terms. Certainly,
however, we had our period here in which that would hardly hold
-we counted our men of affairs, in plenty, who signed by mark.
But schooling has done its work. The idea, which must in good
part derive from the statute, that contracts at large will do well
to be in writing, is fairly well abroad in the land. "His word is
as Rood as his bond" contains a biting innuendo preaching cau-
tion. Meantime the modern developments of business-large
units, requiring internal written records if files are to be kept
straight, and officers informed, and departments coordinated,
and the work of shifting personnel kept track of; the practice of
confirming oral deals in writing, the use of typewriters, of forms
-all these confirm the policy of the statute; all these reduce the
price in disappointments exacted for its benefits. The chief
difficulty lies now in the very common informal verbal under-
standings nodifying performance under a writing once made;
a problem as yet inadequately solved. On the other hand, the
parol evidence rule, in Wigmore's incisive phrasing the rule of
integration, comes in to limit the enforceable agreement to what
is incorporated in a writing, if an apparently complete writing is
once made. Especially, this rule is said to eliminate any prior
or contemporaneous modifying terms. As to agreements drawn
under advice of counsel, the general wisdom of this is obvious;
and the policy fits equally with that great bulk of agreements
which are made wholly by correspondence. But in other cases-
as with informal verbal modifications under the statute of frauds
-the court is faced with the counter policy of recognizing the
frequency with which vital terms of oral negotiations are in fact
omitted from (or not reduced to) a formal writing. The course
of actual decision has, in consequence, no remotest approach to
88 Supra note 85.
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the predictability the rule is supposed to achieve; a point which
can hardly be too strongly stressed. Yet the net effect of the
two rules together, as they work into lay practice, and viewed
simply in their effects outside of litigation, is almost certainly
wholesome; both in encouraging permanent trustworthy record
of agreements, and in inducing care in the making of that record.
System in Contract Law
What now of the apotheosis of technique in contract law: sys-
tem? In our unsystematic legal crazy-quilt contract stands
unique. It is the one field in which a grand-scale orderly syn-
thesis has been attempted, and with fair success achieved. And
this has been lauded as our great legal accomplishment of the
past century.8 9 To the modern Romanist the achievement must
indeed appear as but partial. He sees our very object of syn-
thesis as itself a single element in a still grander scheme: trans-
actions. To a few American scholars, on the other hand, the re-
proach seems in the nature of a compliment. They doubt the
wisdom of generalizations in our law on anything like the scale
attempted by a single systematization of all contract. They
challenge the applicability of the current generalizations to vari-
ous important bodies of cases. 0 Their view is needed, if one is
to understand such developments as the emergence of a peculiar
requirement of "mutuality" in certain contracts, discussed
above; or the twisting of rules to support marriage settlements
and gifts to children; or the division of a reward among partial
acceptors who did not act in concert; or the growth of irrevoca-
bility of offers for certain unilateral contracts where the offeree
is definite, and performhnce takes time, and especially where
accomplishment seems certain; or the occasional irrevocability of
guaranties by death-and so on. Their view is needed, if one is
to see or to state with accuracy what courts are holding. On the
other hand, the vitality of the generalizing tendency is indubita-
ble. It may be noted not only in the scholarly work of the last
seventy years, culminating in the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts. It may be noted as well in the decisions-e.g., in the
extensive submergence, in the field of sales, of the old-time pecu-
liar notions of warranty in the general concepts of promise and
condition.92 So also in the stiffening of many courts, even in the
s9 Compare also the quiet pride of Holmes' remark, in regard to consid-
eration: "Only of late years has it been reduced to the universal expression
of detriment to the promisee." COLLECTED LEGAL PA PERs 218. And again,
in 1881, "The doctrine of contract . . . has been so ably discussed that
there is less room here than elsewhere for essentially new analysis." TnE
COMmON LAW 247. Whereupon essentially new analysis is given.
90 So perhaps most strikingly Underhill Moore and Oliphant.
91 Astounding is the clarity and prophetic vision of Holmes' analysis of
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teeth of pressure from the facts, against allowing an action when
the accepted formulae as to consideration remain unsatisfied, or
in the strict "offer-and-acceptance and so only" approach to
problems of formation which-however many the exceptions 1=
-is a common one whenever a court addresses explicit attention
to the problem.
What effect the generalizing tendency has on contract-makers,
is hard to say. It facilitates the teaching of "business law," but
(apart from rudimentary notions of consideration and of writ-
ing) without so far as I can discover material effect on ways
of action. Rather does it promise effects on laymen chiefly by
way of its effects on doctrine; not in itself and immediately, but
mediately and by way of its effects on what law-men do. To be
sure, a general theoiy of contract must almost certainly come
ultimately to assert a less absolute dominion over "the entire
field" than has been the case in this heyday of its hope; 1: it will
warranty. 2 KENT, op. cit. supra note 85, at *478, note 1, but esp. 0480,
note 1. It is to be remembered that he had not yet seen Hawk-ins v. Pem-
berton (1872), Day v. Pool (1873), Gaylord v. Allen (1873), much lezs
Morse v. Mloore (1891). The law was uncertain, confused, full of fuddled
groping. He leaves it with a clearer statement than one will find today.
He sees sample as a definition of quality. His statement as to merchant-
ability is as good as that of the Sales Act, both his analysis and his
phrasing as to fitness for purpose are better than the Act-though the
omission of a qualification as to dealer and grower was, on the then cases,
an inaccuracy. He explains buyer's recovery of the price after completed
transfer of title as necessarily based on the defect going to the essence,
and suggests that any warranty indicates a quality which the parties
thought to be of the essence. Omitted from express consideration is only
the problem of acceptance as barring damages; even there the modern
answer is presaged. But above all and throughout, he not only keeps sharp
the distinction between contract to sell and sale, but begins each part of the
analysis with the contract, as a problem of contract, and moves only thcnco
to the present sale; and bridges between them by way of purported present
sale of absent goods identified by description, and via contract to sell
identified present goods. On doctrine, as on jurisprudence, the prophet
spoke. 'On doctrine, as on jurisprudence, he went for decades unheard. On
the last point his approach still makes few converts after sixty years. It is
a curious feeling, as I work through the many recently expressed doubts
on the feasibility or wisdom o± centering sales law on the contract, to
realize that all unknowing the battle is being fought over a field the old
master had surveyed when he was younger than we, and is being fought on
the lines he then laid out-Holmes had not however, at that time drawn all
the implications. Note the failure to discuss with any fullness the prob-
lem of "appropriation" in relation to the contract for sale; and especially
the statement in Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, sMtpr note 39 at
4: "Some subjects have acquired a unity in practice that it might be un-
t2 Cf. Larson v. Inland Seed Co., 143 Wash. 557, 255 Pac. 919 (1927).
93 Is the hope fading? "The law of contracts . . . after starting with
some degree of unity now tends from its very size to fall apart." WnILis-
TON, CoNTRAcrs (1921) iii.
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surely grow content to recognize considerable local self-govern-
ment where that is demanded by particular fact-situations ;4 it
will surely come to see the demands for such self-government as
no less normal than their absence. Yet as a body of doctrine
available and pressing for constant application and development
wherever no compelling reason to the contrary appears, no man
can doubt the high utility of system. The quarrel will be rather
along the lines suggested by the Romanist, though on a less con-
ceptualized foundation. Why stop at what we know today as
"contract"? The beginnings of the picture of expansion Pound
has sketched. 5 But all obligation-out-of-transaction will need
canvas alongside obligation-out-of-express-promise before a syn-
thesis will show the framework in the interstices of which the
variations of fact-pattern and tradition-molded remedy are play-
ing.
Meantime it pays to note that here, as always, doctrinal syn-
thesis tends to distort all vision of the underlying reality. For
doctrinal synthesis is and must always be in conceptual terms,
in classes, in supposed uniformities, inclusive, exclusive. The
battle ground of such synthesis is and must always be the mar-
ginal and even pathological case which "tests" the sweeping
generalization. 6 Thus the replacement of a will theory on the
Continent, or the substantial replacement with us of "meeting
of the minds" by a theory of objective manifestations apparently
indicating promise, and reasonably relied on by the other party
-this is indeed a great advance. It covers more cages. The
more which it covers are difficult and delicate and delightful-
and few. The change of theory emphasizes, too, and properly,
the high importance of reasonable expectation in contract, as in
life and law at large. Yet the very advance has obscured the
sociological vitality of the older insight. Is it not clear that if in
all but amazing cases manifestation did not roughly coincide
with intent, we should have neither reasonable reliance in fact
94 Compare the last quotation from Holmes, supra note 86.
95 PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (1925), e. g., 272. And see Maitland.
96 Thus Holmes' insistence on the "formal" character of any contract,
supra note 85-his mind on those less common cases where intent and ex-
pression differ materially. Indeed, in regard to remedy, his thrusting aside
of specific performance (THE COlMION LAW 300 ff.) which does not com-
fortably fit his scheme, approaches quibbling. But in general he stands
almost unique in his ability to systematize without being blinded by his
system, and losing hold neither of the presence of historical survival, nor
the pressure of needs. E. g., ibid. 146, a general principle of torts is an-
nounced: "apart from the extremes just mentioned . .. a key to the whole
subject, so far as tradition has not swerved the law from a consistent
theory." Again, ibid, 135, his general object is to show "that the tendency
of the law everywhere is to transcend moral and reach external stand-
ards;" but two pages later a sociological insight is added to the analytical:
"The moral starting point of liability in general should never be forgotten."
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nor any law of contract to make an "objective" theory of pecu-
liar cases necessary?
In Summa
One turns from contemplation of the work of contract as from
the experience of Greek tragedy. Life struggling against form,
or through form to its will-"pity and terror-." Law means
so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on
the law.
Marginal cases, hospital cases, most of our cases well may be.
Much doctrine, however sweetly spun, serves chiefly to grow
grey with dust against the rafters. Overwhelming is the cer-
tainty that any synthesis which is to match with the meaning of
the law in life must expand beyond the futile limits set by pres-
ent legal theory to include great blocks of what we know as prop-
erty, and equity, and remedies, to cover as well the most signifi-
cant parts of business associations, and who knows what besides.
Overwhelming is the realization of how far a law still built in
the ideology of Adam Smith has been meshed into the new order
of mass-production, mass-relationships. Overwhelming in no
less measure is the conviction that broad forms of words are
chaos, that only in close study of the facts salvation lies.
Against these conclusions stand others. The ad hoc approach
of case-law courts is sane, it cuts close to need, it lives, it grows.
And the work of law and lawyers in the contract field, however
little of the whole it constitutes, has vital meaning. It is both
hinge and key of readjustment. And how, without it, shall the
great gate swing open?
1931]
